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INTRODUCTION
When the question of using the criminal law as a tool to regulate the
sexual behavior of adolescents is raised, volatile socio-political issues
collide. As adolescents grow closer to adulthood, the more difficult it is
to fairly and consistently grant them autonomy while protecting them
from potentially harmful conduct-even conduct they wish to engage in
voluntarily. Thus, anyone who attempts to tackle the issue of regulating
the sexual activity of minors stumbles into a host of related issues that
complicate an already difficult subject.
On one side of the debate are children's rights advocates who seek
to increase the decisionmaking authority of adolescents and, therefore,
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recommend a fundamental rethinking of how adolescent sexuality is regulated.' Likewise, criminal law commentators object to the criminalization of an activity solely on moral grounds and view laws that regulate
voluntary sex between teenagers as being in the same category as the
2
now-obsolete fornication and adultery offenses.
In contrast, pragmatic state legislators concerned with the perception that they are condoning (or worse, encouraging) teenage sexual activity are reluctant to repeal laws that prohibit voluntary sex between
teenagers. 3 Policymakers likewise worry that permitting adolescents the
right to engage in adult-like decisionmaking regarding sexual activity
opens the floodgates to even more difficult issues. 4 The logical next
step would be to grant adolescents the authority to control their health
care decisions (e.g., abortion), the right to determine their religion regardless of their parents' views and, in short, the right to be completely
independent of parental authority before attaining adulthood. 5 Proponents of this view further argue that if adolescents are granted such broad
rights, should they not then carry adult-like responsibilities? 6 If so, adolescents should receive adult penal sanctions from criminal behavior, and
teenage boys should be accountable for the financial support of children
7
they father.
Even though laws regulating the sexual activity of adolescents significantly impact society, critical consideration of these laws is rarely
found in legal literature. Considerable scholarly debate has centered
around rape reform,8 the Supreme Court's decision to allow gender dis1 See, e.g., ROGER J.R. LEVESQUE, ADOLESCENTS, SEX AND THE LAW 60-72, 232-35
(2000); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 1265 (2000).
2 For a discussion of the view that morality and paternalism generally are inadequate
grounds for criminalizing behavior, see JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING 318-24
(1988). See also Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999) (providing a concise overview and a history of the debate over
whether behavior should be made criminal based on moral justifications alone).
3 See Leigh B. Bienen, Defining Incest, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1501, 1508 n.14 (1998)

(discussing political opposition that accused rape reform legislation of "licensing teenage sexual conduct").
4 For evidence of these fears, see Susan Kilbourne, Opposition to U.S. Ratification of
the UnitedNations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Responses to ParentalRights Arguments, 4 Loy. POVERTY L.J. 55 (1998) (addressing arguments that the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of the Child grants children too much autonomy).
5 Id.
6 For a discussion of many of these issues, see Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile Justice
Counterrevolution:Responding to Cognitive Dissonance in the Law's View of the Decisionmaking Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY L.J. 65 (1999).
7 Id.
8 See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE
(1975); SUSAN EsTRicH, REAL RAPE (1987); STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE
CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW (1998); Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape,
and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663 (1999); Bienen, supra note 3; David P. Bryden & Sonja
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parity in the enforcement of a California law, 9 a reasonable mistake of
age defense, 10 and, most recently, federal legislation encouraging states
to enforce statutory rape laws in an effort to reduce public assistance to
teenage girls and their children.''
However, only a handful of legal commentators have examined
carefully the question of how, and whether, the criminal law should regulate voluntary sexual activity between teenagers. 12 One of the few extensive commentaries is provided by Model Penal Code commentators, 13
yet this commentary has proven to be considerably out of step with the
law in most states and does not reflect more recent developments in the
law or social sciences.1 4 The absence of analysis means that questions
concerning the legitimacy of such laws, their scope, and their fundamental structure have been ignored in large part by the academic community.
Professor Michelle Oberman is one of the few regular contributors
to the foundational discussion on the validity and construction of the
criminal law in regulating sexual activity of minors. In a series of articles, Oberman has explored unjust enforcement of statutory rape laws in
further detail, presenting cases in which older boys and men have escaped criminal responsibility after engaging in sexual intercourse with
younger girls under circumstances-such as gang or "posse" situationsthat make it difficult to believe the girls willingly participated in the acLengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J.

CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194 (1997);
Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 777 (1988); Joshua Dressier, Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going:
Some Cautionary Reflections on Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 409 (1998); Lynne
Henderson, Just What Partof No Don't You Understand?,2 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 41 (1993);
Andrew E. Taslitz, Race and Two Concepts of Emotions in Date Rape, 15 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J.
3 (2000).
9 See, e.g., Alice Susan Andre-Clark, Note, Whither Statutory Rape Laws: Of Michael
M., The Fourteenth Amendment, and Protecting Women from Sexual Aggression, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1933 (1992).
10 See Rosanna Cavallaro, A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of Mistake of Fact About
Consent in Rape, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 815 (1996); Larry W. Myers, Reasonable
Mistake of Age: A Needed Defense to Statutory Rape, 64 MICH. L. REV. 105 (1966).
11 See Elizabeth Hollenberg, The Criminalizationof Teenage Sex: Statutory Rape and
the Politics of Teenage Motherhood, 10 STAN. L & POL'Y REV. 267 (1999); Rigel Oliveri,
Note, Statutory Rape Law and Enforcement in the Wake of Welfare Reform, 52 STAN. L. REV.
463 (2000). See infra notes 302-09 and accompanying text for discussion of the term "statutory rape."
12 See Lewis Bossing, Note, Now Sixteen Could Get You Life: Statutory Rape, Meaningful Consent, and the Implicationsfor FederalSentence Enhancement, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1205
(1998); Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent: Toward a New Generation of Statutory Rape
Laws, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 287 (1997); see also Britton Guerrina, Comment, Mitigating
Punishmentfor Statutory Rape, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251 (1998) (arguing for changes in sentencing structure to address perceived injustices in the enforcement of statutory rape laws).
13 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.1-213.4 (1985).
14 See Charles A. Phipps, Children, Adults, Sex and the Criminal Law: In Search of
Reason, 22 SETON HALL. L. J. 1, 17-26 (1997) (discussing the Model Penal Code
commentary).
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tivity.15 In these articles, she considers the background of statutory rape
laws, 16 gender inequality,' 7 prosecutorial discretion,", the capacity of
minors to consent, 19 sociological literature on sexuality, 20 and gender
2
roles in American society. '
Oberman focuses on the substantive criminal law as the key to
reform:
The underlying problem of socializing girls for subordination in their sexual encounters, as well as in general, is
fundamental and deadly serious .... It is therefore central to the feminist task to determine how we should understand, honor, and protect girls' incipient sexuality.
Statutory rape laws are central to this task, but in order
to use them, girls and women must first reclaim these
22
laws.
Rather than viewing statutory rape laws as an antiquated form of
unwanted paternalism, Oberman argues that these laws-once re15 See Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory
Rape Laws, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 15-17 (1994) [hereinafter Turning Girls into
Women] (discussing the "Spur Posse" case in Los Angeles); Michelle Oberman, Regulating
Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48 BuiF. L. REV. 703,
718-29 (2000) [hereinafter Regulating Consensual Sex] (presenting additional cases);
Michelle Oberman, Girls in the Master's House: Of Protection,Patriarchyand the Potential
for Using the Master's Tools to Reconfigure Statutory Rape Law, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 799, 825
(2001) [hereinafter Girls in the Master's House].
16 See Girls in the Master'sHouse, supra note 15, at 800-08; Regulating Consensual Sex
supra at note 15, 709-13; Turning Girls into Women, supra note 15, at 24-36.
17 See Turning Girls into Women, supra note 15, at 61-68; Regulating Consensual Sex,
supra note 15, at 713-17.
18 See Turning Girls into Women, supra note 15, at 37-38.
19 See id. at 42-53. The term "consent" is problematic because it has a legal meaning
that is at odds with its everyday use. That is, children under a specified age are presumed by
law to be incapable of consenting to sexual activity, yet often the term consent must be used to
describe the subjective state of mind of a participant to sexual activity. Because of these dual
meanings, "consent" is a less than ideal term to describe a minor's state of mind concerning a
sexual act. Unfortunately, alternative terminology often is no better.
Joel Feinberg recommends using the term "expresses willingness," which is mostly accurate, though it fails to account for the silent person who subjectively is a willing participant but
does not make any outward expression of willingness. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 331
(1986). Likewise, the term may not accurately describe a person who expresses willingness
verbally, but feels pressure to do so and therefore, subjectively, is not a willing participant.
Oberman often uses the terms "voluntary/nonvoluntary" to express a child's subjective state of
mind. This, too, is potentially problematic, as Feinberg demonstrates. See id. at 115. Because
no single term is accurate in all contexts, I use these terms interchangeably to describe a minor
who: (1) would say that she or he was a willing participant to a sexual act; and (2) notwithstanding contradictions in the law presuming incapacity of a minor, all objective measures of
the minor's conduct demonstrate that the minor's expression of willingness is meaningful.
20 See Turning Girls into Women, supra note 15, at 53-70.
21 See id. at 53-59.
22 See Girls in the Master's House, supra note 15.
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claimed-should be viewed as a necessary tool to protect teenage girls
from men and boys. 23 While recognizing that feminists fighting to overcome inequality have not traditionally adopted such a view, 24 Oberman
stresses that these laws need to be used to provide girls a safe environ25
ment in which to explore their sexuality.
Because few have focused attention on these issues and even fewer
have made concrete recommendations, 26 I will outline, analyze, and respond to her series of articles on this topic. 27 In Part I of this article, I
summarize Oberman's arguments and her recommendations for reconfiguring the law of statutory rape. In Part II, I critique her analysis and
her underlying assumptions in some detail. Although I concur with her
analysis of the fundamental social problems and challenges facing adolescent girls, I conclude that her recommendations would not result in
greater protection of girls from coercive sexual activity. In Part III, I
articulate my proposals for constructing the substantive criminal law to
identify and respond to the problem of non-voluntary teenage sexual
activity.

I.
A.

THE RECONFIGURATION

UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS

The factual and legal assertions Oberman makes in analyzing contemporary problems and potential solutions fall into three categories: assertions about the law, assertions about the victims, and assertions about
the prosecutorial dilemma.
1. The Law and Its Application
Oberman states that the offense of statutory rape is committed any
time two teenagers engage in sexual intercourse, 2 8 a common occurrence
in the "promiscuous era" in which we live. 29 In the opening paragraph of

Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory
23 See id. at 820-21.

24 See id. at 824 (noting that feminists have not been "outspoken advocates" of statutory
rape laws).
25 See id. at 825.
26 For another tangible proposal, see Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent: Toward a
New Generation of Statutory Rape Laws, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 287, 326 (1997).
27 In her attempts to formulate the law, Oberman has moved from broad, general considerations to concrete proposals for reform. Cf. Turning Girls into Women, supra note 15, at 73
("rather than proposing a solution...") with Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 775
("I propose a series of law reforms..."). Because Regulating Consensual Sex presents the
most concrete proposal, my critique focuses primarily on this article.
28 See infra note 148 for quotes from Oberman's articles that demonstrate her view of the
scope of the laws.
29 Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 733 (discussing solutions for a "promiscuous era").
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Rape, Oberman asserts that data on teenage sexual activity reveal a
"staggering" number of at least 7.5 million incidents of statutory rape
each year. 30 Her reasoning is: (1) there are fifteen million teenagers "between the ages of thirteen and sixteen" in the United States; (2) studies
show that half of these teenagers are sexually active; and (3) because
statutory rape laws prohibit all such sexual activity, "there are at least 7.5
million incidents of statutory rape per year."' 3 1 Moreover, she claims the
estimate is "admittedly low" because her calculation does not account for
children under thirteen who are sexually active, nor does it account for
32
repeated acts of sexual intercourse.
In short, Oberman concludes that each time a person under the age
of sixteen engages in an act of sexual intercourse, such an act constitutes
"a separate instance of statutory rape" since "the age of consent to sexual
33
contact under the vast majority of state statutes is sixteen or older."
2.

The Victims

A second major theme in Oberman's work is that girls face particular social and personal barriers that affect their ability to meaningfully
consent to sexual activity with boys. For example, she states:
Many authors, including myself, have written about the
various factors that make teenage girls susceptible to coercion and abuse in sexual encounters.... Investigators
studying adolescent sexuality have identified a multiplicity of factors beyond sexual desire and love that lead
teenagers to consent to sex. Among these are fear, confusion, coercion, peer pressure, and a desire for male
34
attention.
Because of these susceptibilities, Oberman asserts that adolescent
girls often strike "painfully one-sided" bargains, appearing to consent to
35
sexual activity under circumstances difficult for adults to understand.
Thus, in many circumstances, a girl's consent falls into "the gray area
that lies between mutually desired, pleasurable sex and rape."' 36 For this
reason, she argues that statutory rape laws are needed to protect teenage
girls from such encounters. 37 She explores several case studies highlighting four factors-intimidation, acquiescence, adolescent naivet6,
30 Id. at 703-04.
31 Id. (emphasis in original).
32 Id. at 704 n.3.
33 Id. at 703.
34 Id. at 709.

35 Id. at 714.
36 Id. at 733.

37 See Girls in the Master's House, supra note 15, at 825.
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and silence-that "contribute to the problem of nonvoluntary, yet 'con38
sensual' sex among adolescents."
a.

Intimidation

Oberman first points to several cases involving older teenage boys
or men who, as a group, engaged in planned sexual activity with younger
girls and who viewed their activity as a game or conquest. For example,
she discusses the "Spur Posse," a case in which a group of teenage boys
competed with each other to see who could have the greatest number of
sexual encounters with girls. 39 Even though there were reports that the
boys used overt coercion and violence, the district attorney did not prosecute most of the boys.40 Oberman points to a similar case from Michigan
in which high school senior boys targeted freshman girls. 4' The boys
took the girls to one of their homes, gave the girls alcohol and asked the
girls to perform oral sex on them. 4 2 Four of the boys subsequently pled
guilty to relatively minor offenses and were sentenced to short jail
43
terms.
Additionally, Oberman describes a case from Chicago in which an
eleven-year-old and a twelve-year-old girl stayed with older teen boys in
a motel room over a weekend. During this time, at least twelve different
boys had sexual intercourse with each of the girls. Despite the fact that
such conduct was clearly illegal under Illinois law, the investigating law
enforcement officer did not pursue criminal charges against the boys. an
Oberman accurately portrays these situations as involving "predatory sex," commenting that "it is absurd to consider these encounters
consensual. ''45 She uses the above cases to illustrate how boys can intimidate girls into participating in unwanted sex acts without resorting to
46
overt force.

38 Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 717-18.
39 See id. at 718.
40 See Turning Girls into Women, supra note 15, at 15-18 (discussing the press accounts
of the case in greater detail).
41 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 718-19.
42 See Justin Hyde, Three Go to Jail in Grosse Point Rape Case, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS,
Oct. 27, 1998, at B4 (Four boys ultimately went to jail in the case.).
43 Id.
44 Oberman cites only to an interview with a rape victim advocate for the facts of this
case. Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 719 n.54.

45 Id. at 721.
46 See id.
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b.

Acquiescence

Oberman points to State v. Hemme4 7 to illustrate the dynamic of a
48
girl acquiescing to a boy rather than resisting his sexual advances.
Joshua Hemme was nineteen years old when his younger brother was
"seeing" a thirteen-year-old girl, identified by the court as S.Q. One day
after school, Hemme called S.Q. and repeatedly asked her to come over
to his house. She finally gave in and when she arrived at his house,
Hemme took her to his room in the basement. Even though she told him
several times she did not want to have sex, he repeatedly fondled her and
asked her to have sex. Eventually, she sat on a bed with Hemme, and
49
they began to engage in sexual acts.
Oberman uses this case to demonstrate the difficulty in proving
force, and notes that if the victim were fourteen rather than thirteen, "the
encounter would not have been criminal." 50 Moreover, she asserts that
this case demonstrates the "girl's inability to protect herself against being
coerced to participate in [an] unwanted sexual encounter," and she
speculates that the same scenario could plausibly happen if the male
51
were sixteen rather than nineteen.
c.

Adolescent Naivet6

To demonstrate adolescent naivet6, Oberman discusses State v.
Smith, 52 in which three teenage males-ages sixteen, seventeen, and
nineteen-engaged in various sex acts with a thirteen-year-old girl. The
victim was initially alone with the two younger males in her backyard,
where they asked her to engage in sex acts with them. After the
nineteen-year-old Smith arrived, each of the three boys either performed
or attempted to perform sex acts with the victim. Eventually, the defendant told the younger boys to leave, at which time he engaged in several
53
sex acts with the victim.
The two younger boys were not prosecuted, and the nineteen-yearold was convicted "only of committing a lewd act on a minor."' 54 Oberman notes that the trial court departed downward from the sentencing
guidelines based on the victim's consent. 55 She uses this case to demonstrate the girl's passivity, which she identifies as typical of early
adolescence:
47
48
49
50

969
See
See
See

51

See id. at 723.

52

668 So. 2d 639 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).

S.W.2d 865 (Mo. 1998).
Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 721-23.
id. (excerpting the facts from the appellate court's opinion).
id. at 722.

53 Id. at 639-41.
54

55

Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 724.
Id. at 724.
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The extent to which she was inclined to confuse male
sexual attention with true affection, her willingness to
consent to intercourse in order to honor that male attention, and her failure to object more vociferously to conduct that was no longer desired all reflect her relative
youth and powerlessness. In this case, her age-appropri56
ate naivet6 rendered this victim legally rapable.
d.

Silence

Oberman presents the case of State v. Jason B.,57 in which a sixteen-year-old football player gave another football player and a fourteenyear-old girl a ride home. While taking the other player home, the boys
made sexual comments about the girl, and the defendant said he "intended to have the [girl] perform oral sex on him."'58 After dropping off

the friend, the defendant drove the girl to an isolated part of a cemetery,
parked the car and unzipped his pants. The victim testified that he forced
her to commit fellatio upon him, but the trial court found the state failed
to prove the element of compulsion.5 9 The trial court found the defendant guilty of second degree sexual assault, and the appellate court up60
held his adjudication.
Oberman points to this case as an example of how a silent victim
may find herself in circumstances that escalate beyond her control. 6 1
Oberman suggests that the girl's silence in the car may have been due to
discomfort with the situation or fear of the boys. 62 She states the victim's passivity was "nothing other than her age and gender-appropriate
63
behavior.
3.

The ProsecutorialDilemma

After setting forth two baseline facts-that every sexual act between
teenagers is a crime and that in many such cases, the girl's consent is not
meaningful-Oberman asserts that this gives rise to a prosecutorial di56 Id. at 725-26.
57 729 A.2d 760 (Conn. 1999).
58 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 727 (quoting Jason B., 729 A.2d

765).
59 729 A.2d at 765.
60 Id. at 764.
61 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 728. Oberman apparently presumes
the victim was silent. The court's recitation of facts is meager, stating only that the victim
testified at trial that the defendant "forced her to perform fellatio." 729 A.2d at 765. There is
no indication in the court's opinion as to what exactly the victim said or did not say.
62 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 727-28.
63 Id.
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lemma: Given the rate of illegal sex in the United States, what can be
done to enforce the existing law?
Oberman asserts that the criminal justice system has ignored the
problem for many years and that there needs to be a system for determining which cases to prosecute. She states:
Contemporary society's relatively promiscuous climate
makes it extremely difficult to articulate the appropriate
role for the criminal justice system in approaching adolescent sexual interactions. It is unimaginable that statutory rape laws could be fully enforced. And yet, if they
are to be enforced selectively, which cases most merit
punishment? 64
In summary, Oberman posits two facts that give rise to a dilemma.
First, the law of statutory rape in the United States prohibits any sexual
activity between teenagers. Second, because numerous societal factors
make it difficult for girls to meaningfully agree to sexual activity, illegal
sex between teenage boys and girls represents a massive national problem. The resulting dilemma is how prosecutors can prioritize all of these
cases of statutory rape for punishment. Oberman next summarizes how
she perceives cases of statutory rape are currently prioritized and argues
that these strategies are ineffective.
B.

PERCEPTIONS OF

How

PROSECUTORS PRIORITIZE

Oberman states that contemporary solutions addressing problems of
statutory rape are ill-advised or ineffective. 65 She identifies three current
approaches that represent the modern approach to dealing with statutory
rape.
First, she argues that cases involving teenage pregnancy are given
top priority for prosecution. Without question, the problem of teen pregnancy was a central concern at the national level and in a few states in
the 1990s. 66 In welfare reform legislation enacted in 1996, the United
States Congress determined that the number of women receiving public
assistance could be reduced if they stopped having babies at a young
64 Id. at 706; see also id. at 704 ("for many years, a large number of adolescents have
engaged in illicit sexual conduct, and ...the criminal justice system has looked the other
way"); id. at 754 ("[T]he problem with overly broad statutory rape laws in an era in which a
large portion of teens are sexually active lies in establishing meaningful enforcement

guidelines.").
65

See id. at 752 (stating that contemporary enforcement patterns leave "an entire realm

of victims wholly unprotected").
66 See id. at 734-38.

384

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 12:373

age.6 7 Since sex between adults and minors is a crime across the country, Congress directed the states to "aggressively enforce" statutory rape
laws. 6 8 Legislators reasoned that if states would enforce these laws,

older men would stop getting young girls pregnant, who would then stop
having babies, who would then not need public assistance; and ulti69
mately, the dollars flowing from the federal treasury would be reduced.
Oberman-along with other legal commentators-objects to this
70
legislation.
Second, Oberman argues that prosecutors pursue only the most easily identified cases. The first type of easily identified cases are those in
which health care providers and state agencies are required to report suspected child abuse. In line with the pregnancy prevention rationale,
some states have encouraged or mandated certain agencies that interact
with children to report a suspected crime when they encounter pregnant
teenagers. 7 1 Thus, when a teenage girl applies for public assistance or
seeks health care for pregnancy, the state agency or health care provider
must report the interaction to law enforcement officials.
The second type of easily identified cases that are more likely to be
pursued than cases involving voluntary teenage sex are those concerning
large age differences or clear exploitation. 72 Oberman calls this the
"that's sick" test and identifies it as the most common mechanism for
determining which cases to prosecute. Within this category of cases, she
identifies "incestuous or quasi-incestuous encounters, relationships between young people and those in a position of trust or authority, and
73
sexual activity between young people and significantly older partners."
To support her assertion, she examines a few state laws and surveys appellate cases to conclude that cases involving substantially older perpetrators, family members, and the like are, indeed, more likely to be
74
prosecuted than cases involving voluntary sex between teenagers.
67 See The Personal Responsibility, Work Opportunity, and Medicaid Restructuring Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 906, 110 Stat. 2105, 2349-50 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 14016).
68

Id.

69 As stated by Senator Lieberman: "In examining [the problems of teen pregnancy and
statutory rape], we answered two necessary questions: First, who is on welfare? Second, how
did they get there?" 141 CoNo. REC. S8419 (July 22, 1996).
70 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 737-38. For a thorough critique of
the pregnancy prevention rationale, see Hollenberg, supra note 11.
71 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 741 (citing California as an
example).
72 See id. at 750 (contrasting cases of 'consensual sexual relationships' between peers
with cases involving older perpetrators).
73 See id. at 744.
74 See id. at 746-51 (finding that eighty-one percent of national cases and ninety-one
percent of Illinois cases constituted "overreaching" or an age span of ten or more years).
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Although she appears to support the practice of treating serious
cases seriously, 75 she claims that focusing on the "sick" cases "turns a
blind eye to the coercion and abuse that may infect sexual encounters
among peers."' 76 The result is that by failing to prosecute all cases of sex
between teenagers, prosecutors are "reinterpreting and narrowing the
scope" of statutory rape laws. 77 In other words, by focusing only on the
serious "sick" cases, prosecutors ignore an entire universe of cases of
78
illegal sex between juveniles.
After setting out her view of the problem and the failures of the
criminal justice system to respond to the problem, she concludes with a
dismal assessment that "[r]ead together, these three enforcement strategies leave an entire realm of victims wholly unprotected. ' 79 Then, she
turns her attention to strategies for responding to the problem in a comprehensive manner.
C.

THE PROPOSED REFORM

1. Co-opt Existing Law
Oberman asserts that teenagers are engaging in illicit sex in staggering numbers, that the criminal law as currently written prohibits this sex,
and that prosecutors are not using the law to protect girls:
On some occasions, a girl may consent to sex which is
exploitative, degrading, demeaning, and harmful to her.
But the law does not recognize it as rape. The harm
which results from a minor's bad decision in a sexual
encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a
bad business deal. Yet, the law, as presently construed,
does not protect minors from the harmful consequences
80
of their attempts at adult sexual behavior.
By the phrase "as presently construed," she apparently means that,
even though the law is clear that teenagers under a certain age are per se
incapable of consenting to sex, the law is not being used to punish instances of "exploitative, degrading, and demeaning" sex. 8 1 Because she
construes the law as throwing such a wide net that it captures all voluntary sexual activity by teenagers, she argues that the central problem is
75 See id. at 751.
76 See id.
77 Id.
78 See id.
79 See id. at 752.

80 Turning Girls into Women, supra note 15, at 71.
81 Id.
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one of enforcement. That is, girls are not adequately protected because
82
the wrong criteria are being used for enforcing existing law.
In spite of her view that the law fails to protect minors who engage
in sexual activity, her primary recommendation is that the substantive
criminal law not be fundamentally changed. In fact, she goes through in
some detail other reform proposals (such as lowering the age of consent
and abuse of a position of trust as a proxy and setting clear age differentials) and rejects each of these as an incomplete means for improving the
plight of adolescent girls. 83 She argues that reform proposals that focus
on age differentials or "overreaching" are problematic in that they impose upon statutory rape prosecutions all the problems of adult acquaintance rape cases. 8 4 Ultimately, she concludes that the best solution is to
retain the law in its current form:
[S]tatutory rape laws emerge as an important tool for
prosecutors. Prosecutors may be reluctant to charge the
acquaintance rapist with forcible rape and risk losing the
case because of society's tendency to blame the victim.
Rather, the prosecutor may charge the rapist with statutory rape, (wherein the only required proof is that there
was sexual contact with an underage victim.. .), and thus

be assured of a conviction. Statutory rape laws therefore
provide a de facto stop gap, permitting the law to punish
those who commit the crime of rape, but who might escape punishment because of deep-seated societal norms
85
that undermine convictions.
Oberman criticizes statutorily enacted objective criteria such as age
differentials or abuse of a position of authority in determining which
cases to pursue,8 6 arguing instead that prosecutors should use the discretion afforded them by a strict liability crime to identify and prosecute
87
cases of statutory rape.
82 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 754 ("[Tjhe problem with overly
broad statutory rape laws in an era in which a large portion of teens are sexually active lies in

establishing meaningful enforcement guidelines.").
83 See id. at 758-75. For example, she evaluates and rejects the proposals of Schulhofer,
id. at 764-65, Kitrosser, id. at 765-67, and Oliveri, id. at 759-60. See SCHULHOFER, supra
note 8; Kitrosser, supra note 12; and Oliveri, supra note 11.
84 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 752.
85 Girls in the Master's House, supra note 15, at 820-21; see also Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 778 ("I believe the better approach to the dilemma lies in enlisting
the law as a tool to be used by adolescents themselves as they navigate their sexual
development.").
86 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 768-71.
87 Girls in the Master's House, supra note 15, at 825.
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Occasionally, Oberman discusses definitional matters. For example, in Girls in the Master's House she states: "These laws must be
reconfigured from their cores, beginning with a central definition of coercion and exploitation." 88 She likewise visits the definition of coercion
in Turning Girls into Women:
Currently, the law prohibits intercourse with minors by
virtue of age-range, and proximity of family relation. A
revised statute could identify additional sexual scenarios
as presumptively suspect or even illegal by definition.
For example, legislators could enact a rule barring sexual encounters between several males and one minor female. Likewise, the law could require greater scrutiny of
evidence that a minor girl consented to sex. For example, courts could require a critical examination of the
method by which consent was procured, disallowing
89
forms of behavior deemed coercive.
On these occasions, however, Oberman does not attempt to define
coercive behavior or specify the standard the court would use in scrutinizing the evidence. 90 In the end, Oberman's call to reconfigure the law
is not a call to redefine consent or otherwise work to identify objective
factors that demonstrate a lack of consent. Rather, she argues that prosecutors should employ traditional strict liability sex crime statutes to prosecute sex between juveniles.
2.

Lower the Level of Punishment

After establishing her baseline call for active use of statutory rape
laws, Oberman proposes reconsidering overly harsh sentences for certain
offenders. She argues that when juveniles are subject to incarceration for
statutory rape, they are less likely to be prosecuted, which teaches them
that the behavior is acceptable, and in so doing perpetuates the cycle of
unacceptable behavior. 91 For this reason, she argues that instead of using
incarceration as the primary punishment, prosecutors and judges should
"employ the broad range of options available under the law in crafting
punishments for those guilty of statutory rape."'92 The focus of such a
system primarily is on rehabilitation, with the use of psychological eval88 See id. at 825.
89 See Turning Girls into Women, supra note 15, at 75.
90 In Regulating ConsensualSex, wherein Oberman makes specific reform proposals, she
makes no mention of the need to redefine coercion. In Girls in the Master's House, Oberman
identifies definitional matters as important, but she makes no specific recommendations. See
Girls in the Master's House, supra note 15, at 825.
91 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 775.
92 See id. at 776.
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uations to identify "a predatory sex offender, as opposed to one who is
93
attracted to a particular underage teen."
She states that this approach demonstrates "a realistic understanding
of adolescent sexuality."'94 In her words, "it is important to acknowledge
that mistakes will occur." 95 Since they have engaged in unacceptable
behavior, these boys need to be punished. However, because their actions do not rise to the level of outright coercion, they should not receive
the full impact of the law by being labeled as sex offenders the rest of
their lives. Thus, existing law may be too harsh "to the extent that the
law ignores the learning curve at work in adolescent sexual encounters," 96 but some punishment should be imposed so as not to con97
done the behavior.
3.

Empower Victims

After arguing that existing statutory frameworks should be used
more aggressively, Oberman proposes certain statutory reforms, the first
of which is that an age of consent of at least sixteen be retained. 98 The
second component of Oberman's statutory reform is to empower victims
by involving them more directly in charging and sentencing decisions. 99
In particular, she argues that for a first offense, the victim should decide
whether to allow the perpetrator to receive a suspended sentence. 1° Essentially, this suggestion amounts to implementing a formalized system
of deferred prosecution.10 1 Thus, if the defendant successfully complies
with counseling, community service, or other conditions imposed by a
court, the criminal charges are dismissed. While Oberman recommends
that the victim make the decision, she states that if the victim does not
make this decision, the prosecutor should. 10 2 Oberman suggests an exception for cases involving aggravating factors such as abuse of a position of authority or very young victims; in these cases, victim
10 3
cooperation would not be dispositive.
It is important to note that she is not recommending simply that the
victim be heard, but that the victim's recommendation be determinative.
93 See id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 777.

97 See id.
98 See id. at 778.
99 See id. at 778-79. For a discussion of ambiguity concerning the scope of her proposal, see infra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
100 See id. at 778.
101 For a discussion of deferred prosecution (also called pre-trial intervention and pre-trial

diversion), see United States v. Flowers, 983 F. Supp. 159, 161-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
102 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 778-79.
103 See id. at 779.
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For example, in the context of discussing the impact her reform would
have on health care providers, she states: "[The reform] would alleviate
the pressure toward mandated reporting by health care and social service
providers, in that the young person would be permitted to decide for
herself whether the relationship in which she was engaged was consensual."' 4 Elsewhere, she proposes reform of statutory rape laws so they
can be "a tool to be used by adolescents themselves as they navigate their
sexual development." ' 0 5 Thus, her call is for victim involvement far beyond that provided in victims' rights legislation.
Finally, Oberman recommends that laws call for prosecutors and
courts to use victim impact statements and provide victim assistance.106
She further supports the use of long statutes of limitation, arguing that it
may be years before many girls are empowered to disclose a coercive
0 7
relationship.'
Oberman argues that these recommendations are helpful for several
reasons. First, by enlisting victim cooperation, they eliminate the possibility that prosecution of truly wanted, voluntary sex will take place.' 0 8
Second, she contends this approach will eliminate the need to force
health care providers and others to report abuse.' 0 9 Third, she argues
that her approach will avoid imposing unnecessarily harsh sentences in
an era of sex offender registration and three strikes laws." 0
II.

A CRITIQUE OF THE RECONFIGURATION

Oberman makes several challenging and thought-provoking recommendations that deserve serious consideration. Because the premises
upon which she bases her arguments are critical to her proposed solution,
I will first examine the validity of these underlying assumptions.
A.

MISTAKEN

AssuMPTIONS

1. The Law and Its Application
In Regulating Consensual Sex, Oberman opens with an attentiongrabbing assertion: Each year, there are at least 7.5 million incidents of
statutory rape in the United States involving teenagers under the age of
sixteen."1 ' Oberman calculates this figure by first asserting that "each
104 Id. at 781.
105 Id. at 778.
106 See id. at 781-82.
107 See id. at 782-83.
108 See id. at 781.
109 See id.
110 See id. at 781-82.
III The entire paragraph reads:
A 1995 study revealed that, by the age of sixteen, 50% of U.S. teenagers have had
sexual intercourse. This result, which echoes the findings of many similar studies,
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incident of sexual intercourse among this population is illicit," and then
1
concluding that data on teenage sexual activity. 12
Though this is indeed a staggering statistic, it is not accurate. Most
significantly, this assertion represents an incorrect statement of the law.
A review of state statutes demonstrates that in most states it is not a
crime for two teenagers of comparable age to engage in an act of voluntary sexual intercourse. 113 That is, in thirty-eight states most voluntary
sexual activity between teenagers of comparable age is not "statutory
rape."',

14

States use a variety of mechanisms to exclude voluntary sex between teenagers from the reach of the criminal law. In many states the
law sets a minimum age a defendant must have attained before an offense exists; typically, this age falls somewhere between seventeen and
twenty-one. 115 In other states, a crime is committed only if the defendant
is a specified number of years older than the victim-four years is a
common age span requirement. 1 6 And yet other states have created
reveals a serious problem for criminal justice. The age of consent to sexual contact
under the vast majority of state statutes is sixteen or older, and thus, each incident of
sexual intercourse among this population is illicit-each constitutes a separate instance of statutory rape. The numbers are staggering. Utilizing U.S. Census Bureau
figures, the 50% figure implies that there are at least 7.5 million incidents of statutory rape per year.
Id. at 703 (emphasis in original, citations omitted).
112 Id. at 703-04.
1 13 In a footnote Oberman states: "It is also worth noting that the definition of statutory
rape varies across jurisdictions." Regulating ConsensualSex, supra note 15, at 704 n.3. However, nowhere does she explain that these definitions entirely undermine her basic assertion,
thus rendering the caveat rather hollow.
114 See Appendix B for a listing of these states. See infra notes 270-98 and accompanying text for a more precise explanation of how the state statutes break down.
115 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-106 (Michie 1997) (twenty years old); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-42-4-9 (West 1998) (eighteen years old); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.050, 510.060
(Lexis 1999) (eighteen and twenty-one years old, depending on age of the victim); MD. CRIM.
L. CODE ANN. § 3-307 (MIcHIE 2002) (twenty-one years old); Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.034
(West Supp. 2002) (twenty-one years old); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319, 28-320.01 (1995 &
Supp. 2000) (nineteen years old); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.364(3) (Lexis 2001) (eighteen years
old); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.25, 130.40 (Supp. 2001) (defendant twenty-one when victim is
under seventeen); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.30, 130.45 (Supp. 2001) (defendant eighteen when
victim is under fifteen); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-05 (Michie 1997) (an adult); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.04 (Supp. 2001) (eighteen years old); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1112
(West 1983) (eighteen years old); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-6 (Lexis 2000) (eighteen years old);
VA. CODEJANN. § 18.2-371 (Michie 1996) (eighteen years old).
116 See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-62(a)(l) (Lexis Supp. 2001) (two years); ALASKA STAT.
§§ I1.41.436(a)(1) (Michie 1996) (three years); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-1407(F) (West 2001)
(two years); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402 (2001) (four years); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-71
(West 2001) (two years); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 762(d) (Michie 2001) (four years); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-730 (Lexis Supp. 2002) (five years); IOWA CODE § 709.4(2)(c)(4)
(West Supp. 2002) (four years); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:80(A), 14:81.2(A) (West Supp.
2001) (two years); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 254 (West Supp. 2001) (5 years); MD.
CRIM. L. CODE ANN. § 3-308 (Michie 2002) (four years); MINN. STAT. § 609.344 (West Supp.
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some combination of a minimum defendant's age and age differen17
tials. 1
Indeed, only twelve states have the type of statute that Oberman
presumes to be the norm across the country." 8 In these twelve states,
there is no limitation on the age of the defendant and no requirement of
an age differential; thus, voluntary sexual activity between teenagers is a
crime. Even in these states, though, the laws often lower the severity
level of the offense when a small age differential exists. 1 9 Furthermore,
in four of these twelve states, the offense is reduced to misdemeanor
status, taking it outside the common understanding of the term "statutory
12 0
rape" altogether.
Thus, because the vast majority of voluntary sexual activity between
teenagers under the age of sixteen is not illicit and does not amount to
"statutory rape," Oberman's premise that prosecutors must sort through
millions of cases of illegal voluntary sexual activity is factually incorrect.
The criminal justice system will only consider those cases involving co2002) (two years); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95 (Lexis 2000) (three years if the victim is aged
fourteen or fifteen; two years if the victim is under fourteen); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2
(West Supp. 2002) (four years); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(F) (Michie Supp. 2002) (four
years); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7A (1993 & Supp. 1996) (four and six years); OR. REV.
STAT. § 163.345 (2001) (three years); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3122.1 (2001) (four years); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-1(5) (Lexis Supp. 2002) (three years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-506
(2001) (four years); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (West Supp. 2002) (three years); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-401.1, 76-5-401.2 (2001) (7 & 10 years); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.079
(West 2000) (two years); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-5 (1992) (four years); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 62-304 (Michie 2001) (four years).
117 See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62(a)(1) (Lexis Supp. 2001); ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.436(a)(1) (Michie 1996); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-1407(F) (West 2001); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:80(A) (West Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 254 (West Supp.
2001); MD. CRIM. L. CODE ANN. § 3-307 (MIcHiE 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (Lexis
2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(F) (Michie Supp. 2002); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.345,
163.355, 163.435, & 163.445 (2001); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8B-5, 61-8B-9 (Lexis 2000).
118 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261.5, 289(h) (West Supp. 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 800.04(4)(a) (West Supp. 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3 (Lexis 1999); IDAHO CODE § 181508 (Michie 1997); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-15(b) (West Supp. 2002); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3522 (Supp. 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 23 (West 2000); MIcH. COMP.
LAWS § 750.520d (West Supp. 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 632-A:3(II) (Lexis Supp. 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(3) (1985); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 948.02, 948.09 (West 1996).
119 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261.5, 289 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3
(2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-63 (Michie 2001).
120 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(b) (West Supp. 2002) (misdemeanor if the defendant is
within three years of age); CAL. PENAL CODE § 289(h) (West Supp. 2002) (misdemeanor if
victim is under eighteen); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3(b) (Lexis 1999) (misdemeanor if victim is
fourteen or fifteen and the age difference is less than three years); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 5/12-15(b) (West Supp. 2002) (misdemeanor if the accused is under seventeen or if the
victim is thirteen to sixteen and there is less than a five year age differential); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 948.09 (West 1996) (misdemeanor if the victim is aged sixteen or older). The term "statutory rape" implies a felony offense-the offense being the statutory version of the common
law felony rape. See Phipps, supra note 14, at 10-11.
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ercion, significant age disparity, or the like because in most states voluntary sex between teenagers of comparable ages is not a violation of the
criminal law.
Oberman attempts to further quantify the scope of the problem by
claiming 7.5 million incidents of statutory rape occur each year. This
figure does not withstand scrutiny. According to the 1990 Census, there
were 9,903,716 teenagers in the United States aged thirteen, fourteen,
and fifteen.12 1 Because girls become sexually active at different ages
than boys, the data must be broken down into sexes, thus showing there
were 4,829,274 girls aged thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen in 1990.122 Social
scientists estimate that approximately forty-three percent of girls under
the age of sixteen have engaged in sexual intercourse.1 23 Therefore, of
the 4.8 million girls counted in the 1990 Census, approximately two million are likely to have engaged in at least one act of sexual intercourse.
121

See

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULA-

17, tbl.13 (1992). This report
indicates that in 1990, the Census Bureau counted 3,339,000 thirteen-year-olds; 3,243,107

TION: GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, UNITED STATES

fourteen-year-olds; 3,321,609 fifteen-year-olds; and 3,304,890 sixteen-year-olds. I have been
unable to reconstruct Oberman's assertion that 1990 U.S. Census Bureau data show there were
fifteen million U.S. residents "between the ages of 13 and 16." See Regulating Consensual
Sex, supra note 15, at 703-04 & 704 n.3. If Oberman intends the fifteen million figure to be
inclusive of both thirteen- and sixteen-year-olds, the data from the 1990 Census adds up to
13,208,606. However, given that she asserts inthe very same paragraph that the age of con-

sent in most states is sixteen, then logically sixteen-year-olds should not be included in this
figure. Thus, the Census Bureau data show that there were 9,903,716 teenagers aged thirteen,
fourteen, and fifteen in the United States in 1990.
The 2000 Census reports 12,082,485 individuals in these age categories. See U.S. Census
Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 1,Matrix PCTI2, Table QT-P2, available at http://
factfinder.census.gov.
122 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION:
GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, UNITED STATES 17, tbl.13 (1992).
123 See Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Youth Risk
Behavior Surveillance-UnitedStates, 1999, MORBIDITY

AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT,

Vol. 49 (June 9, 2000), at 75 (Table 30). The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reports that
forty-three percent of tenth grade girls and fifty-one percent of tenth-grade boys say they have
engaged in sexual intercourse. The prior CDC report provides nearly identical numbers for
girls, though a smaller number of boys who reported engaging in sexual intercourse by the
tenth grade. Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Youth Risk
Behavior Surveillance-UnitedStates, 1997, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT,
Vol. 47 (Aug. 14, 1998), at 70 (Table 26) (43.5 percent of tenth-grade girls and 41.7 percent of
tenth-grade boys reported having engaged in sexual intercourse). Since nearly all teenagers
reach their sixteenth birthday during the tenth grade, these numbers fairly reflect a reasonable
estimate of the percentage of children under the age of sixteen who have engaged in sexual
intercourse.
Oberman asserts that by age sixteen, fifty percent of U.S. teenagers are engaging in sexual intercourse. See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 703 (citing Charles W.
Warren et al., Sexual Behavior Among U.S. High School Students, 1990-1995, 30 FAM. PLAN.

170 (1998)). However, the Warren et al. study cited by Oberman lumps together all
high school students (grades nine through twelve), and does not break down the data by age
category. Thus, it is not the best source for this statistic.
PERSP.
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However, social science research also indicates that only about
seven percent of girls aged fifteen to seventeen engage in sex with males
six or more years older than the girl-an age differential that is nearly
certain to constitute a criminal offense under the laws of most states (for
girls under sixteen). 124 Assuming that the seven percent figure holds for
thirteen- and fourteen-year-olds,1 25 one can estimate that each year
140,000 girls (seven percent of two million) in the United States aged
thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen engage in sexual activity with someone more
than five years older. In other words, the above contortions result in a
figure of around 140,000 girls under the age of sixteen who are victims
1 26
of statutory rape each year in the United States.
124 See Jacqueline E. Darroch et al., Age Difference Between Sexual Partners in the
United States, 31 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 160 (1999). The Alan Guttmacher Institute reports that,
among sexually active girls aged fifteen to seventeen, sixty-four percent of the girls' sexual
partners were within two years of the girls' age, twenty-nine percent were within three to five
years, and seven percent of the girls had partners six or more years older. Id. at 163. Compare
Laura Duberstein Lindberg et al., Age Differences Between Minors Who Give Birth and Their
Adult Partners,29 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 61 (1997) (twenty-seven percent of mothers aged fifteen
to seventeen reported having partners five or more years older).
125 This assumption may or may not be correct. One study found that nearly thirty percent of male partners of thirteen-and fourteen-year-old mothers were aged twenty or older.
See Don J. Taylor et al., Demographic Characteristicsin Adult Paternity for First Births to
Adolescents Under 15 Years of Age, 24 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 251 (1999). Taylor et al.
examined all birth records in California from 1993-1995 and reported that men aged twenty or
above were the fathers in 26.7 percent of cases of pregnancy of girls under the age of fifteen.
Although several factors make this study difficult to generalize (forty-two percent of the girls
studied were Hispanic, among whom the percentage of very young pregnancies was four times
the rate of whites; about one-fourth of the total sample did not provide an age for the fathers;
the study examined the limited population of girls who gave birth, rather than examining the
entire population of sexually active girls), it suggests the number may be higher than seven
percent. See also M. Joycelyn Elders & Alexa E. Albert, Adolescent Pregnancy and Sexual
Abuse, 280 JAMA 648 (1998) ("Research suggests that the younger the mother, the greater the
partner age gap, with men on average 4.2 years older than senior high school mothers and 6.7
years older than junior high school mothers.").
Yet another survey found that only twelve percent of male partners to girls aged thirteen
to fifteen in Vermont were five or more years older than the girl. Importantly, this figure
includes all sexually active girls, not just those who became pregnant. See also Harold
Leitenberg & Heidi Saltzman, A Statewide Survey of Age at First Intercoursefor Adolescent
Females and Age of Their Male Partners: Relation to Other Risk Behaviors and Statutory
Rape Implications, 29 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 203, 208 (2000).

126 In order to be more accurate (or perhaps simply to be less inaccurate), this number
would need to be increased by some unknown (and largely unknowable) percentage to reflect
the twelve states in which it is a crime regardless of the age of the parties, and then adjusted
again to reflect the fact that some of these states are very populous (e.g., California, Illinois).
It would need to be altered further to reflect the states with an age differential of less than five
years. And, of course, all of these numbers rely upon accurate underlying data from multiple
social science studies, each of which has its own potential methodological flaws. See, e.g.,
Robert T. Michael, Abortion Decisions in the United States, in SEX, LOVE, AND HEALTH IN
AMERICA: PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC POLICIES 377, 430-35 (Edward 0. Laumann & Robert T. Michael, eds. 2001). Michael critiques data from the Alan Guttmacher Institute (AGI) in
a different context, ultimately concluding that there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of the
AGI statistics. However, the Michael critique demonstrates the ways in which social science
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One could go through the same exercise with the male population
and come up with a comparable figure, but it should be clear that so
many factors are either unknown (e.g., the number of teenagers in each
age group whose sexual partners are substantially older) or too time consuming to be worth tracking down (e.g., exactly how each state's child
sexual abuse laws play out) as to virtually guarantee the inaccuracy of
this type of estimate. What is clear is that Oberman's figure of 7.5 million victims is hyperbolic and unsupportable as a representation of the
incidence of statutory rape in the United States.
In contrast, readily available social science literature provides reasonable estimates of the prevalence of unwanted and non-voluntary sexual activity between teenagers. For example, Vogeltanz et al. asked a
nationally representative sample of more than 1,000 women about childhood sexual experiences. 27 The researchers asked the women whether
28
they experienced any unwanted sexual activity before age eighteen,
and they found that approximately twenty percent of the women reported
some unwanted sexual experiences as children. 129 Of these, twenty-nine
percent of extrafamilial abusers were boyfriends, and an additional
30
twelve percent were male playmates.'
Likewise, Abma et al. asked women to rate on a scale of one to ten
the degree of wantedness of their first sexual intercourse experience (one
meaning "you really didn't want it to happen at that time" and ten meaning "you really wanted it to happen"). 13 1 The researchers also asked the
women whether the intercourse was voluntary. While ninety-one percent
of women reported that their first intercourse was voluntary, approximately one-quarter of them gave a score of four or lower indicating that
data is subject to scrutiny and shows how a slight change in data can have significant policy
implications. AGI is the publisher of the journal Family PlanningPerspectives, the source of
some of the data presented above.
127 See Nancy D. Vogeltanz et al., Prevalence and Risk Factors for Childhood Sexual
Abuse in Women: National Survey Findings, 23 CHILD ABusE & NEGLECT 579, 585 (1999).
128 Specifically, the researchers asked about:
(a) any intrafamilial sexual activity before age 18 and that was unwanted or that
involved a family member 5 or more years older than the respondent; and (b) any
extrafamilial sexual activity that occurred before age 18 and was unwanted, or that
occurred before age 13 and involved another person 5 or more years older than the
respondent.
Id. at 582.

129 Id. at 583. Depending on the definition used and the method of analyzing the data, the
researchers estimated a prevalence in their sample ranging from 17.3 percent to 24.0 percent.
130 See id. at 585.
131 See Joyce Abma et al., Young Women's Degree of Control over First Intercourse:An
Exploratory Analysis, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 12 (1998). Oberman cites this study to support

the assertion: "In their yearning for femininity, [girls] may become compliant and cooperative
when pressured for sex." See Girls in the Master's House, supra note 15, at 820.
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nearly one in four women did not want to engage in sex at that time. 132
Thus, from ten to twenty-five percent of women in this study reported
their first intercourse in negative terms.
These are only two of the numerous studies that attempt to determine prevalence of unwanted childhood sexual experiences,1 33 but they
adequately demonstrate the scope of the problem. Although it is difficult
to translate these studies into exact ages, relationships, and numbers for a
given year, 134 the studies demonstrate that a substantial number of teenage girls in the United States are victims of non-voluntary sexual
activity.
Oberman asserts that it is unimaginable to try to prosecute the more
than 7.5 million incidents of statutory rape each year; 135 that the criminal
justice system ignores the large numbers of juveniles engaging in illicit
sexual conduct; 136 and that, given these numbers, an overwhelming problem is the prioritization of cases. 137 While there is no question that juvenile sexual activity is commonplace in the United States and that a
disturbingly large percentage of this is unwanted or involuntary, Ober132 The terms "wanted/unwanted" are used in the social science literature to refer to a
subjective state of mind of a participant. See Abma et al., supra note 131, at 12. See also
Vogeltanz, supra note 126, at 582. Thus, the terms "wanted/unwanted" can encompasses conduct ranging from forcible rape to first intercourse that a person later indicated they did not
want. That is, the person agreed to (or did not object) to a sexual act, but when asked later, the
person would say she or he did not desire the act at that time.
133 See also Pamela 1. Erickson & Andrea J. Rapkin, Unwanted Sexual Experiences
Among Middle and High School Youth, 12 J. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH 319 (1991) (noting that
eighteen percent of sixth through twelfth graders reported experiencing unwanted sex; though
many of these were abuse by an adult, a substantial number of girls reported having unwanted
sex with a friend or boyfriend); Kristin Anderson Moore et al., Nonvoluntary Sexual Activity
Among Adolescents, 21 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 110 (1989); Diana E.H. Russell, The Incidence and
Prevalence of Intrafamilial and Extrafamilial Sexual Abuse of Female Children, 7 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 133 (1983); Jay G. Silverman et al., Dating Violence Against Adolescent
Girls and Associated Substance Use, Unhealthy Weight Control, Sexual Risk Behavior, Pregnancy, and Suicidality, 286 JAMA 572 (2001) (citing that between nine and 13.4 percent of
girls under eighteen reported being subjected to sexual violence alone or a combination of
sexual and physical violence in a dating relationship); Gail E. Wyatt, The Sexual Abuse of
African American and White American Women in Childhood, 9 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 507

(1985).
134 Researcher David Finkelhor concludes that a reasonable summary of the literature
indicates that approximately twenty percent of adult women report being sexually victimized
as children. See David Finkelhor, Current Information on the Scope and Nature of Child
Sexual Abuse, in 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 31, 42 (1994). Finkelhor estimates that approximately 500,000 children each year are victims of sexual abuse, but this calculation does not
attempt to determine how many of these are victimized by a peer. Id. at 43. Finkelhor also

provides a good review of the methodological problems in deriving accurate numbers. Id. at
32-42.
135 Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 704, 706.
136

Id. at 704.

137 Id. at 733.
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man's assertions concerning the extent of criminal sexual activity be138
tween teenagers are unsupportable.
2.

The Victims

To demonstrate the dynamics of victimization, Oberman examines
several shocking cases in which older boys engaged in sexually exploitive activity with younger girls. While these cases serve as dramatic illustrations of the problem of coercive sex between teenagers, many of
the case studies also demonstrate that current law has a remedy for the
39
wrongs committed. 1
Consider State v. Hemme,' 40 the case Oberman uses to demonstrate
acquiescence by adolescent girls.' 4' In reciting the facts, she describes it
as a case of a nineteen-year-old male who engaged in multiple acts of
oral sex with S.Q., a thirteen-year-old girl. What she fails to note is that
the reported opinion discusses a fifteen-year-old victim as well-in fact,
the issue on appeal is the joinder of the two cases. 142
Just as with S.Q., Joshua Hemme repeatedly asked J.B., the fifteenyear-old, out for dates, and she consistently refused. Eventually, when
he had an opportunity to be alone with her while she was babysitting,
Hemme fondled J.B. and digitally penetrated her vagina. Three separate
times she told him she did not want to have sexual intercourse with him.
Twice she tried to get up to leave, and he pulled her back down. 143
Hemme was charged with a nonconsensual offense' 44 against the
fifteen-year-old and two counts against the thirteen-year-old that did not

138 For a thorough and excellent discussion of the findings and the gaps in the social

science literature, see LEVESQUE, supra note 1, at 60-72, 232-35.
139 This is not to say that the system is without failure. Several of Oberman's examples,
according to the facts as she presents them, demonstrate that crimes clearly occurred and yet
were not prosecuted. See, e.g., Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 779-20 (discuss-

ing a Chicago case in which law enforcement did not pursue allegations of clear abuse against
eleven- and twelve-year-old girls). While inadequate enforcement of existing law is a separate
problem, it does not in itself demonstrate a need to reform the underlying substantive law.
140 969 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
141 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 721-23.

142 Hemme, 969 S.W.2d at 865.
143 Id. at 867-68.
144 See id. at 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.070 (1994)). Section

566.070 defines the crime as: "A person commits the crime of deviate sexual assault if he has
deviate sexual intercourse with another person knowing that he does so without that person's
consent." Id.
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require proof of nonconsent. 145 He was convicted on all charges and
46
sentenced to a total of eleven years incarceration. 1
While Oberman does not report the facts of the real fifteen-year-old
victim, she uses Hemme to point out a hypothetical problem that could
exist.' 47 Discussing the thirteen-year-old victim, she speculates:
What is perhaps more interesting about the case is to
consider the response it might have generated had these
parties not been separated by an age difference of six
years. Under Missouri law, this encounter would not
have been criminal had the victim been age fourteen,
148
rather than thirteen.
However, Oberman fails to point out that the case did in fact involve an older victim-the fifteen-year-old-and that the state did in fact
successfully prove that Hemme acted knowing that the victim had not
consented to the sex act. 149 Moreover, Hemme's treatment of both victims was highly similar: he pressured each to go out with him, he lured
each into situations in which they were alone with him, and he ignored
the pleas of each girl not to engage in sexual acts. 150 Thus, the statutory
scheme worked both in regard to the younger victim protected by the
strict liability provision and the older victim protected by the traditional
rape statute (deviate sexual intercourse in this case).
Oberman also uses the case to support the assertion that "permitting
statutory rape guilty pleas to substitute for acquaintance rape trials, undermines the seriousness of the offense of forced sex, and thus erodes the
legitimacy of laws against rape."' 15 She goes even further to claim, "Be145 See Hemme, 969 S.W.2d at 865-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 566.032 (1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.062 (1994)). Section 566.032 reads: "A person commits the crime of statutory rape in the first degree if he has sexual intercourse with another
person who is less than fourteen years old." Id. Section 566.062 states: "A person commits
the crime of statutory sodomy in the first degree if he has deviate sexual intercourse with
another person who is less than fourteen years old." Id.
146 Hemme, 969 S.W.2d 868 (seven years on the statutory rape charge and five years on
the statutory sodomy charge to run concurrently and four years on the deviate sexual assault
charge to run consecutively).
147 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 722-23.
148 Id. at 722. She repeats these assertions in Girls in the Master's House, arguing that
certain factors "point to societal norms that likely would undermine the chances that Hemme

could be convicted for [a nonconsensual] rape. S.Q. likely would be blamed by a jury for her
failure to object more vigorously to Hemme's advances." Girls in the Master's House, supra

note 15, at 819. While there is ample evidence that juries are reluctant to convict in acquaintance rape cases, Hemme goes against this trend since the jury in that case convicted him of

forcible offenses against a victim even closer to his own age. Hemme, 969 S.W.2d 865.
149 Hemme was convicted of deviate sexual assault for his acts with J.B. Hemme, 969
S.W.2d 865. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.070 (1994).
150 Hemme, 969 S.W.2d at 867-68.
151 Girls in the Master's House, supra note 15, at 822.
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cause he was charged with statutory rape, rather than rape, the law tacitly
accepts that the sexual encounter between Hemme and S.Q. was consensual, rather than forcible."' 52 While such an argument could be valid in
a hypothetical situation, these criticisms are not applicable to Heome.
Not only did the case go to trial (rather than settle for a reduced plea), the
two cases were joined, obviously showing to the jury that the defendant
was a forcible rapist (which is certainly why he wanted the cases tried
separately-thus the appeal). Moreover, Joshua Hemme received longer
terms of incarceration for the "statutory" offenses than he did for the
nonconsensual offenses,1 53 which once again goes against Oberman's assertion that the "statutory" offense "erodes the legitimacy of laws against
rape." 54 Contrary to Oberman's assertions, the law as applied to this
case did not tacitly accept the sexual encounter as consensual; rather, the
law explicitly condemned Hemme's acts as coercive and criminal.
When viewed in its entirety, Hemme demonstrates the type of coercive behavior often involved in cases of acquaintance rape. The defendant could be portrayed by a defense attorney as a "boyfriend," but in
fact he was a person who used force and coercion to subject younger
girls to non-voluntary sex. Given that the case resulted in rape convictions with serious penal consequences, it also represents success for the
prosecutors and demonstrates that the statutes provide protection for adolescent girls in Missouri. 155 While the factual recitation of the case provides evidence of the dynamics Oberman is presenting, certainly the
outcome of the case also demonstrates something about the successes of
the existing criminal justice system.
As with her discussion of Hemme, Oberman draws selected facts
from State v. Smith 56-the case in which three older teenage males engaged in sex acts with a thirteen-year-old girl-to make a point as to
"adolescent naivet6" of teenage girls. However, Oberman use of the
facts to springboard into a criticism of prosecutors and judges is incomplete. She states:
The fact that the defendant [Smith] was not charged with
rape is not a fluke. .

.

. Prosecutors, worried about

whether they might succeed in obtaining a conviction
against a defendant when the victim initially consented
to some sexual contact, often opt for the easier route of a
statutory rape charge. And the trial court's response to
this victim-viewing her as a "loose" girl who had con152
153
154
155
156

Id. at 822 n.80 (emphasis added).
Heroie, 969 S.W.2d at 868.
Girls in the Master's House, supra note 15, at 822.
Hemine, 969 S.W.2d at 868.
688 So. 2d 639 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).

2003]

MISDIRECTED REFORM

sented to sexual contact with all three boys, rather than
as a victim of unwanted anal penetration, and a subse57
quent vaginal rape-validates the prosecutors' fears.'
As with Hemme, however, Oberman fails to highlight several key
facts. Most significant is the fact that an appellate court reversed the trial
court's decision. The trial judge in State v. Smith departed downward
from sentencing guidelines on the grounds that the victim's prior conduct
was consensual. The appellate court noted, "[lit is inconceivable that the
key feature of this criminal statute, i.e. irrelevancy of the child's consent
to sex, would nevertheless be a basis to disregard the statutorily prescribed penalty for its commission."1 58 The appellate court focused on
the fact that an adult and a thirteen-year-old were engaged in sexual intercourse, describing the victim's state of mind or vulnerability as irrelevant.1 59 While Oberman notes the reversal in a footnote, she does not
point out the significance of the appellate court's reversal. Given that
Oberman uses the trial court's action to demonstrate the "disastrous consequences" of judicial bias, 60 surely it is noteworthy that the higher
court viewed the trial court's interpretation of the law as applied to the
sexual abuse of a thirteen-year-old as "inconceivable."
Moreover, Oberman's claim that the thirteen-year-old victim's
"age-appropriate naivet6 rendered this victim legally rapable" implies
that she was sexually violated with no criminal consequences. 16 1 This
clearly was not the case, as the defendant was convicted of two counts of
157 Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 724-25.

158 Smith, 668 So. 2d at 642 (emphasis added). The court has since receded from this
holding in part. See State v. Rife, 733 So. 2d 541 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (en banc), affirmed, State v. Rife, 2001 WL 359697 (Fla. 2001) (unpublished opinion). In Rife, the victim
was sixteen and seventeen at the time of the offenses, and the court distinguished Smith on the
grounds that the thirteen-year-old victim in Smith was not a willing participant, whereas the
justices viewed the older victim in Rife as a fully willing participant. 733 So. 2d at 544. See
infra notes 267-71 and accompanying text for additional discussion of this case.
The facts of Rife-as restated by one of the dissenters-present another compelling factual situation demonstrating the insecurity and naivetd of a child who can be taken advantage
of by an adult. See Rife, 733 So. 2d at 547-51 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
159 Smith, 668 So. 2d at 644 (stating that "neither the level of intimacy nor the degree of
harm are relevant when an adult and a child under the age of sixteen engage in sexual
intercourse.").
160 She states: "This failing [that judges cannot see force when the act looks consensual]
has disastrous consequences for young girls who are the victims of unwanted sexual contact."
Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 725.
161

Id. at 726. Perhaps Oberman considers the victim "legally rapable" because Smith

was not convicted of an offense that carried with it the label "rape;" the offense for which he
was convicted was labeled a "lewd act upon a child." See Smith, 668 So. 2d at 640. If her
concern is one of terminology, then under these circumstances, the better label for Smith is
"child molester"-a term often associated with one who commits a lewd act upon a child.

Whether he is labeled "child molester" or "rapist," though, does not much matter. What is of
consequence is that he received a substantial punishment for his sexual abuse of a child.
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committing a lewd act upon a child, offenses that carried a term of incarceration ranging from nine to twenty-two years. 162 The younger girl was
the victim of a sexual offense, and the defendant was punished with a
lengthy incarceration for his criminal behavior.
Finally, Oberman discusses Jason B., 16 3 the case in which the sixteen-year-old football player was adjudicated as a youthful offender for
sexual acts committed against a fourteen-year-old girl. 164 Even though
this case represents a prototypical "acquaintance rape" case with all its
problems of proof, the result was a criminal conviction. Thus, the criminal laws of the state recognized the criminal violation against the
younger girl, and the older, exploitive boy was punished.
In summary, Oberman's case studies are useful in that they explore
in detail, with real victims, the dynamics of sexual victimization. However, the cases she cites also serve to demonstrate that the criminal justice system does, at times, properly detect and punish exploitive sexual
behavior against juveniles. To this extent, the case studies fail to support
Oberman's ultimate point that the law is desperately in need of reform.
3. The ProsecutorialDilemma
After laying the groundwork that millions of teenagers in the United
States are sexually active and that all sexual activity by teenagers under
the age of sixteen is criminal, 165 Oberman presents the fundamental dilemma she perceives results from this situation-that prosecutors face
the daunting problem of how to prioritize cases. 16 6 According to Ober162 The appellate court noted that the appropriate guidelines for this offense permit a
sentence of nine to twenty-two years incarceration. Smith, 668 So. 2d at 642. Smith also has
his picture, address, and identifying information posted on the internet as a registered sex
offender. See Fla. Dept. of Law Enforcement, Sexual Offenders/PredatorsSearch System, at
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/sexualpredators (last visited Oct. 18, 2002).
163 729 A.2d 760.
164 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 726-28.
165 Oberman's articles repeatedly reinforce the view that all sexual activity between teenagers should be prosecuted as criminal conduct. Indeed, the very title of the article Regulating
Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory Rape highlights the opinion that
statutory rape laws should be used to regulate consensual sex with (i.e., between) minors. For
other examples, see Turning Girls into Women, supra note 15, at 73 ("[T]he attempt to identify
differing degrees of sexual coercion by age or family relation seems to endorse the notion that
fully consensual intercourse between teenagers is the norm, and is not legally problematic.");
Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 751 (Statutory rape laws are enforced "at the
margins, rather than in the main," with the main being consensual sex between minors and the
margins being cases involving coercion, wide age disparities, and the like.); id. at 733 ("What
is difficult about statutory rape is selecting which rapes, of the millions that take place every
year, merit prosecution."); id. at 750 ("[T]here is an apparent consensus among prosecutors
against enforcement of statutory rape laws in cases of 'consensual sexual relationships' between peers. This is explicitly acknowledged by some state criminal justice officials, and is
plainly evidenced by the numerous enforcement strategies that focus exclusively on older
perpetrators.").
166 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 733.
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man, it is not a problem of differentiating the coercive from the noncoercive or of improving reporting. 67 Rather, the problem, she says, is
one of prioritizing the 7.5 million incidents of sexual intercourse between
teenagers-each of which, according to Oberman, constitutes a criminal
act. 168
As was demonstrated above, however, in most states no crime is
169
committed when two teenagers engage in voluntary sexual activity.
Therefore, Oberman's prosecutorial dilemma does not exist at a national
level. 170
B.

FALSE PERCEPTIONS

Oberman criticizes the way in which prosecutors prioritize cases,
71
arguing that while strict liability offenses are not difficult to prove,1
167 The underreporting of crime and the failure to prosecute acts that are clearly criminal
are entirely separate matters. It is well established that many acts of non-voluntary sex go
unreported and that even among reported cases of both voluntary and non-voluntary sex involving children, prosecutors and law enforcement officers often fail to pursue cases with
much vigor. See infra note 292. Oberman's suggestion, however, is that prosecutors are perfectly aware that vast numbers of children are engaging in illicit conduct (voluntary sex between teenagers) and that they are faced with a daunting problem in prioritizing these cases.
168 On a few occasions, Oberman appears to recognize that some sexual activity between
teenagers can be wanted and fully voluntary. See Girls in the Master's House, supra note 15,
at 825 ("We must use the shelter of [statutory rape laws] to articulate a coherent vision of
healthy sexual socialization as a critically important adolescent task in which one ideally enjoys room for experimentation, while at the same time remaining protected from coercion and
exploitation."); Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 752 ("To be sure, some of those
omitted from protection may be engaged in mutually desired, pleasurable sexual relations.");
Regulating ConsensualSex, supra note 15, at 777 ("The challenge in reforming statutory rape
law lies in determining how to protect adolescents as they move through their teenage years,
enabling them to explore and grow sexually, without leaving them completely open to the
harms of coercion, exploitation and abuse."); Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at
778 (noting that strict enforcement of the law could "burden[ ] some of the 'under age' population with unnecessary 'protection' from desired sexual relationships").
Ultimately, though, she returns to the theme that all sexual activity between teenagerseven that which appears by all objective accounts to be fully voluntary-must be closely
regulated by the state in order to avoid exploitation of girls who cannot meaningfully agree to
participate in the sexual activity. See Regulating ConsensualSex, supra note 15, at 704 ("the
fact that a behavior is typical does not necessarily dictate that it should be completely
unregulated").
169 See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
170 Even in those states in which voluntary sex between teenagers is a crime, prosecutors
are not perplexed as to how to prioritize cases. If there is no evidence of coercion or other
wrongful conduct, prosecutors simply do not have the resources (or the inclination) to prosecute these cases. See Sandy Nowack, A Community ProsecutionApproach to Statutory Rape:
Wisconsin's Pilot Policy Project, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 865, 873-74 (2001) ("In reality, noncoerced sexual contact between two adolescents is not typically charged without some aggravating factor.").
171 Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 733. This in itself is a highly questionable assertion. Oberman states:
The problem with statutory rape law enforcement is not that it is difficult to prove.
Indeed statutory rape laws are fine examples of strict liability offenses. In most
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prosecutors use inappropriate methods in "selecting which rapes, of the
millions that take place every year, merit prosecution."'' 72 She claims
that prosecutors primarily select cases in which teenage girls are pregnant or the perpetrator is "sick," while ignoring nearly all other cases of
statutory rape. These empirical claims, however, do not withstand close
examination.
1. Of the Pregnancy Factor
Action by Congress and several state legislatures in the 1990s left
the impression that a primary societal objective in enforcing sexual
crimes against adolescents is to lower the expenditure of government
funds for children born to teenage girls.' 73 Oberman accurately perceives the legislative priorities demonstrated by these laws. Much less
jurisdictions, all that is needed to determine culpability is evidence that the victim's
age falls within the framework protected under state law, and the sexual contact
occurred. The defendant's state of mind, including the extent to which believed his
partner was older than she was, generally is irrelevant. Relatively speaking, these
are easy crimes to prove.

Id. (emphasis added).
Material published by the national association of prosecutors who prosecute these crimes
takes an entirely different view of such cases. The opening paragraph of the child abuse prosecution manual produced by the National District Attorneys Association states:
Child abuse is uniquely difficult to prosecute. No other type of case presents such
consistently complex psychological and social dynamics. No other type of case so
often requires the prosecutor to go to trial with a child as the most crucial witness.
NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS

Assoc.,

INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE 1

(2d ed.

1993). While the NDAA manual uses the term "child abuse" rather than "statutory rape," its
authors are addressing the same topic Oberman raises-sexual crimes against minors that are
strict liability offenses. Unlike Oberman, however, the prosecutors believe these are difficult
cases to prove. Further, the class of cases on which Oberman focuses-sexual activity involving two juveniles-represents an exceedingly difficult class of cases to prosecute. Teenagers
frequently are not sympathetic witnesses; rape shield laws may very well not exclude evidence
of a teenager's other sexual activities; and often the only witness is a teenager whose credibility is attacked. Moreover, as in cases of date rape, judges and juries have proven to be extremely reluctant to believe victims. Thus, even though the offense is a strict liability crime,
there is no assurance of a guilty verdict. See also Nowack supra at 874-75 (discussing "the
same difficult proof issues" presented by other sexual assaults).
172 Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 733.
173 See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. I agree with Oberman that a focus
solely (or primarily) on teenagers who get pregnant to the exclusion of other victims is a poor
criterion to use in determining which cases to prosecute. See Regulating Consensual Sex,
supra note 15, at 737-38. In fact, the legislative focus on teen pregnancy in the 1990s inspired
me to think seriously about the construction of child sexual abuse statutes in the United States.
See Phipps, supra note 14. In that article I stated:
A societal message that an adult male will be prosecuted only if he gets a girl pregnant risks overlooking the harm caused to the many children who do not get pregnant, as well as overlooking all harm to boys and pre-pubescent girls. While harm to
society generally-including economic harm-is one factor to consider in making
conduct criminal, the harm to the child always should be society's first concern.
Id. at 119.
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persuasive, though, is her conclusion as to the degree to which state and
federal laws have affected prosecutors' sense of priorities.
Oberman cites a California program as evidence of the focus on
pregnancy prevention. A special unit in the governor's office, the Statutory Rape Vertical Prosecution Unit (SRVP), awards grants to assist local units of government in prosecuting statutory rape. 174 Moreover, the
SRVP web page identifies pregnancy prevention as a purpose of the stat1 75
utory rape vertical prosecution program.
A look at the SRVP's published report, however, draws into question the extent to which legislative policies have affected prosecutors.
For example, the three cases provided as "representative" of cases being
prosecuted through the SRVP program all involve classic instances of
child sexual abuse. 1 76 One case involves a thirty-nine-year-old man convicted of offenses committed against a fourteen-year-old neighbor and
nine-year-old niece. 177 The second example is an adult female defendant
(no age given) convicted of having sex with a fifteen-year-old male
neighbor. 178 The third example is a thirty-two-year-old man convicted of
179
committing sex crimes against a fourteen-year-old female neighbor.
The report does not summarize the ages of all defendants prosecuted
through the program, nor does it indicate how many of the victims were
pregnant or how often pregnancy was a factor in charging decisions.
Commentary by local communities also is telling. The SRVP program administrator in one county reported:
We thought we'd be getting Romeo and Juliet cases, but
it's been more serious than that. The girls are really
young. Most of these men are very predatory.... These
guys are picking on these girls because they are easy to
180
manipulate and control.
Thus, rather than increasing prosecutions only of defendants who
impregnated girls, California prosecutors appear to have found that in174 GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING, STATUTORY RAPE VERTICAL

PROSECUTION REPORT (2000).

175 The web page states: "California teen pregnancies had reached epidemic proportions
resulting in major societal consequences. As a response to this serious problem the Governor's Office, through OCJP, provides grant funding to District Attorney's Offices to vertically

prosecute unlawful sexual intercourse cases and provide community outreach and education."
See www.srvp.net (last visited Oct. 18, 2002).
176 GovERNOR'S OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING, supra note 174, at 8-9. Other
states with comparable reports are similarly unilluminating on this issue. See WISCONSIN OFFICE OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, SEXUAL ASSAULTS IN WISCONSIN 1998 (1999).
177 GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING, supra note 174, at 8.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 9.
180 Hollenberg, supra note 11, at 275.
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creased attention and increased funding enabled them to more aggressively respond to the problem of child sexual abuse in their communities.
If pregnancy were one of the top three factors used by prosecutors
in screening cases, one would expect to see evidence of this in other
sources. Yet Oberman produces no such evidence, nor can I find any.
Social science research, for example, does not identify pregnancy as a
screening criterion considered by prosecutors. The authors of one study,
for example, examined more than 1,000 cases in which child advocacy
center employees interviewed minors (up to age eighteen) about suspected sexual abuse. The researchers examined the case records and attempted to identify factors that affect whether a case is successfully
prosecuted. 18 1 Although the researchers note several factors related to
both offenders and victims that seem to affect success in prosecution,
82
pregnancy is not mentioned.'
Comparable studies of case flow are similarly unenlighteningpregnancy simply is not mentioned as a factor. 183 While these studies
are not directly on point in that they look at prosecution outcome rather
than entry into the system, if cases were being screened in primarily
based on the victim's pregnancy (to the exclusion of all others), one
would expect pregnancy to be considered as a variable in case outcome.
While none of this data alone is determinative, taken together, the
absence of a focus on pregnancy in the relevant literature leads to the
conclusion that pregnancy prevention is not a primary aim of prosecutors. While a pregnancy may provide physical evidence (e.g., DNA material) that helps prosecutors prove a case, prosecutors and other
professionals do not identify pregnancy as a key factor in charging decisions and case outcomes, nor do they teach pregnancy identification as a
strategy for prioritizing cases. 184 Therefore, in spite of a legislative emphasis in some states, empirical data fails to support Oberman's assertion
that prosecutors across the country became fixated on pregnant victims
during the late 1990s.
2.

Of Easily Identified Cases

Oberman's second perception is that prosecutors focus solely on
easily identified cases to the exclusion of many other problematic
181 See Delores D. Stroud et al., Criminal Investigation of Child Sexual Abuse: A Comparison of Cases Referred to the Prosecutorto Those Not Referred, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 689 (2000).
182 See id. at 696-97 (identifying factors such as age, sex and ethnicity of child; relationship of offender to child; and injury to child).
183 See ELLEN GRAY, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE

108-30 (1993); Theodore P. Cross et al., CriminalJustice Outcomes of Prosecution of Child
Sexual Abuse: A Case Flow Analysis, 19 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1431 (1995).
184 See generally Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Assoc., supra note 171.

2003]

MISDIRECTED REFORM

cases.1 8 5 She argues that by focusing on such cases, prosecutors "cheat"
all other girls out of the protection that is afforded them under the statutes.' 86 Further, she claims that prosecutors ignore other "relatively neutral" approaches to screening cases, 18 7 and choose, instead, prioritization
methods that "tend to identify predominately poor, minority girls and
88
their partners."
Oberman cites states legislation that requires health care providers
and state agencies to notify prosecutors when they encounter teenagers
who are pregnant or infected with a sexually transmitted disease.189 Tennessee, for example, enacted a law in 1996 that "encourages" a person
providing treatment to a pregnant girl under eighteen to make a report if
the person discovers that the father is four or more years older than the
child. 190 The law does not mandate reporting and it requires the consent
of the patient or parent before making the report. A different law requires a state agency to make a report when a teenager between the ages
of thirteen and seventeen applies for public assistance.' 9 1
As with her criticism of the pregnancy prevention rationale, Oberman is correct in pointing out the shortcomings of this approach. Certainly a primary focus on pregnant teenagers risks excluding many other
92
cases of sexual exploitation in which a victim does not get pregnant.
However, the fact that a few legislatures acted fails to demonstrate that
pregnancy prevention has become one of the top three methods by which
93
prosecutors prioritize cases.1
185

Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 751.

Id. at 751-52 ("[Tjhe tendency to target cases involving overreaching or wide age
ranges turns a blind eye to the coercion and abuse that may infect sexual encounters among
peers.... By reinterpreting and narrowing the scope of crimes prosecuted under statutory rape
laws, the executive branch has cheated girls out of the protection ostensibly provided them by
these statutes.").
187 Oberman argues that policing teenage "parking" spots would be a mostly neutral manner in which to identify cases:
Indeed, it seems likely that a nightly sweep of the 'parking' locales in any given city,
suburb or country town would yield ample work for the local district attorneys [sic]
office. This method of selecting cases would be relatively neutral in terms of its
impact upon young people of varying race, ethnicity and socio-economic status. (Of
course, it might disproportionately overlook the poorest youths, who presumably
have less access to cars[.])
186

Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 739.
188

See id.

189 See id. at 739-43.
190 TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-1-302(a) (1997).
191 Id. § 38-1-305 (1997).
192 Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 742.
193 Oberman does not use these statutes merely as examples of isolated instances of misplaced legislative policies. Rather, she uses these laws as evidence of "existing mechanisms
for selecting statutory rape cases for prosecution." Regulating ConsensualSex, supra note 15,
at 753; see also id. at 752 ("these three enforcement strategies leave an entire realm of victims
wholly unprotected"), at 753 ("Contemporary statutory rape enforcement priorities re-
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To begin with, this type of legislation was passed only in a handful
of states, making it difficult to argue that it represents any type of national trend. 194 Moreover, even in those states in which legislation was
enacted, Oberman provides no support for the factual assertion that reporting by health care providers and state agencies changed or increased
in those states. At most, these laws may have increased reporting for
95
acts that did not fall within existing child abuse reporting statutes.
While limited anecdotal evidence shows a few prosecutors have considered pregnancy a key reason to prosecute cases, 196 there is no evidence
that this trend has taken hold in most prosecutors' offices around the
country.
Oberman also asserts that prosecutors screen cases by choosing only
the worst, or "sick," cases to prosecute. She states:
Perhaps the most common means of narrowing the potential docket of statutory rape prosecutions involves focusing on the most obviously exploitative scenarios in
which statutory rape violations occur. These include incestuous or quasi-incestuous encounters, relationships
between young people and those in a position of trust or
authority, and sexual activity between young people and
97
significantly older partners.1
veal...."). Thus, she is claiming that these "enforcement strategies" are priorities across the
country and reveal systematic flaws in how cases are selected for prosecution.
194 See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-17-35 (2000) (creating an out-of-wedlock pregnancy
task force); TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-1-305 (1997) (requiring reporting to law enforcement
when a pregnant teenager aged thirteen to seventeen applies for public assistance). See also
Abigail English & Catherine Teare, Statutory Rape Enforcement and Child Abuse Reporting,
50 DEPAUL L. REV. 827, 839 (2001) (citing statutory changes in Nevada, Texas, Maryland and
Virginia).
195 It is well documented that cases enter the child protection system primarily through
teachers, doctors, and other mandated reporters. See, e.g., Gail L. Zellman & Kathleen
Coulbom Faller, Reporting of Child Maltreatment, in THE APSAC HANDBOOK ON CHILD
MALTREATMENT 359, 362 (John Briere et al. eds., 1996). For discussion of mandatory reporting statutes, see Victor I. Vieth, Passoverin Minnesota:Mandated Reporting and the Unequal
Protection of Abused Children, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 131 (1998).
Social science reports also highlight the fact that mandatory reporters often do not make
reports even when the law requires them to do so. See Steven Delaronde et al., Opinions
Among MandatedReporters Toward Child Maltreatment Reporting Policies, 24 CHILD ABUSE
& NEGLECT 901 (2000) (indicating fifty-eight percent of social workers, physicians, and physician assistants indicate they do not report all cases). In particular, many doctors and social
service agencies habitually fail to report their interactions with young girls who are pregnant
under circumstances in which the pregnancy itself would give the professional reason to believe the child had been abused or neglected. To this extent, then, empirical justification exists
for policymakers to revisit the effectiveness of mandatory reporting statutes.
196 See Oliveri, supra note I1,at 474-77 (citing newspaper stories and statutes to demonstrate enforcement efforts).
197 Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 743-44.
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On this point she is entirely correct. Law enforcement officers are
likely to place a high priority on allegations of a father molesting his
teenage daughter, an older step-sibling molesting a teenage step-sister, or
a teacher molesting a student. In contrast, a case involving two teenagers
engaged in voluntary sex will receive little, if any, attention from crimi98
nal investigators or prosecutors.
Rather than viewing the prioritization of cases by severity as an objective and reasonable approach, though, Oberman identifies this as a
problem. She reasons:
[T]his enforcement pattern [i.e., the "that's sick test"] is
not wholly unproblematic for those who ostensibly fall
under the law's protective arm. As is the case with the
focus on pregnancy, the tendency to target cases involving overreaching or wide age ranges turns a blind eye to
the coercion and abuse that may infect sexual encounters
among peers.
To support this assertion, Oberman points to her case studies to illustrate that none of them involved age disparities of ten years (apparently concluding that prosecutors overlooked those cases because they
did not involve wide age disparities).' 99 She also claims that age-span
provisions would allow a seventeen-year-old to have sex with a twelve2 °0
year-old.
Four responses are in order. First is the factual assertion that prosecutors focus on the most serious cases while ignoring "coercion and
abuse" in other situations. Although this is possible in theory, Oberman
provides no empirical evidence to demonstrate either that prosecutors
routinely ignore cases involving coercion between peers or that they
would not consider these to fall within the umbrella of "sick" cases.
Second, in stating that a focus on objective factors "assumes that
problematic sexual encounters can be identified by objective factors such
as age difference," Oberman presumes that the existence of a statute
spelling out objective factors necessarily makes legal all conduct falling
outside of those factors. This simply is not the case. The fact that objective criteria may apply in some circumstances in no way means that an
198 In the context of evaluating pleas, the prosecutors' manual states:

A primary consideration in plea negotiations should be the severity of the abuse.
Obviously, the greater the violence or duration of criminal acts, the greater the number of victims involved, and the greater the impact of crimes on the victims, the
more reasons there are to pursue a case vigorously.
NAT'L DIST. ArORNEYs Assoc., supra note 171, at 224.
199 Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 751 ("consider the fact that none of the

cases discussed in Part I of this article involve age disparities of ten years").
200 Id. at 768-69.
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offense is unprosecutable if the factor is not present. Assume, for exampie, that a statute declares that a person aged seventeen or older who
engages in sexual activity with another under the age of fourteen commits the offense of statutory rape. A defendant who is sixteen and who
uses force or coercion would still be criminally liable, though under a
separate statutory provision. 20 The fact that a legislature has enacted a
strict liability provision with objective criteria such as age span provisions does not mean that the legislature intends other statutory provisions
to be ignored.
Third, Oberman's case studies do more to demonstrate the legitimacy of age span provisions than to undermine them. As noted above,
nearly all of the cases she cites resulted in criminal convictions either
under strict liability or nonconsensual rape statutes. 20 2 Thus, rather than
demonstrating how age-span provisions caused these cases to be ignored,
the case studies demonstrate how wrongful conduct can be identified
both by statutes involving age spans and statutes in which coercion must
be proven. Therefore, Oberman's own evidence demonstrates how statutes that objectively identify unacceptable behavior in no way exclude
the possibility of prosecuting cases of "problematic sexual
encounters."

20 3

Finally, Oberman is incorrect as a matter of law in asserting that
twelve-year-olds who have sex with seventeen-year-olds will be unprotected. Nearly every state divides sex offenses against minors into at
least two tiers, creating a more serious offense involving younger victims
(typically under fourteen) and a less serious offense involving older victims (typically those aged fourteen and fifteen). 20 4 With the first tier
offenses-those involving the youngest grouping of children-none of
the exceptions and qualifications discussed in this article exist. That is,
when a victim is twelve, the age of the perpetrator is irrelevant, making
sexual activity between a seventeen-year-old and a twelve-year-old a serious felony anywhere in the United States. 20 5 Although such provisions
201 See, e.g., Hemnie, 969 S.W.2d at 866, in which the court applied Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 566.070 (1994) (deviate sexual assault); Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.032 (1994) (first degree statutory rape); and Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.062 (1994) (first degree statutory sodomy); see also
statutes listed in appendix D.
202 See supra notes 141-64 and accompanying text. The problem in most of the remaining cases was the lack of enforcement even though the conduct was criminal under existing
statutes.
203 Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 752.
204 See Phipps, supra note 14, at 55-59.
205 Some states retain age span provisions for children in this group, none of which would
encompass the seventeen-year-old. See Phipps, supra note 14, at 63 n.25 1.
Issues of same-age sexual activity also arise in the context of young children, but few
would argue that two ten-year-olds having sex constitutes normal adolescent development. At
this age, it is usually indicative of other personal or family problems and intervention is war-
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are not perfect and some statutes may fail to identify problematic conduct, few modem statutes are so imprecise as to lead to the result she
imagines.
Oberman does not stop here, however. She makes a broader criticism of use of the "that's sick" test that has much more significant
implications:
In more practical terms, the focus on extreme age differences or overreaching assumes that problematic sexual
encounters can be identified by objective factors such as
age difference. This reflects an underlying assumption
that, so long as it was not forced, sex among peers
causes no real injury to victim [sic]. This latter assumption saddles statutory rape law with all of the problems
20 6
of prosecuting acquaintance rape.
She goes even further in Turning Girls into Women:
The new generation of statutory rape laws, with complex
age-span provisions designed to identify potentially coercive interactions, does little to remedy the problems inherent in the common law .... [T]he attempt to identify
differing degrees of sexual coercion by age or family relation seems to endorse the notion that fully consensual
intercourse between teenagers is the norm, and is not le20 7
gally problematic.
Thus, Oberman concludes that a focus on the "sick" cases not only
causes prosecutors to ignore cases between teenagers that involve "coercive" conduct, it also causes them to ignore cases of "fully consensual
20 8
intercourse between teenagers."
The conclusion implicit in this criticism is that prosecutors should
place "sick" cases on par with cases involving fully voluntary sex. Indeed, by arguing strongly that use of objective factors to prioritize cases
is of little use and, in fact, obstructs prosecution of other harmful cases,

ranted-both for the protection of the children and their rehabilitation. See infra notes 312-14

and accompanying text.
206 Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 751-52. Oberman asserts that such
prioritizing amounts to a "reinterpreting and narrowing" of laws intended to protect all children. Id. at 751.
207 Turning Girls into Women, supra note 15, at 73.
208 Id. She goes on to claim: "Girls need the law to secure their sexual autonomy. And

statutory rape laws, both as traditionally conceived and as presently construed, miserably fail
this task." Id.

410

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 12:373

Oberman appears to be arguing for abandoning the use of objective crite20 9
ria in prioritizing cases.
Two examples demonstrate how prioritizing cases based on severity
is essential in a society that devotes limited resources to the prosecution
of criminal cases.
Example One. Tina (age fifteen) and Ted (age fifteen)
are sophomores in high school who are attracted to each
other. Ted asks Tina out to a movie one Friday night
and afterward Ted suggests they return to his house because his parents are not home. At the house Tina and
Ted engage in sexual intercourse that they both describe
as fully voluntary.
Example Two. Sue is a fifteen-year-old whose mother
has a new boyfriend who, along with his son, has moved
in with them. The boyfriend's sixteen-year-old son,
Sam, has pursued Sue relentlessly since moving in by
constantly making sexual suggestions. Virtually every
night he tells her she can have sex with him whenever
she wants and that his door is always unlocked. She
does not like Sam, but one night she wakes up in the
middle of the night with him in bed with her. She does
not physically resist, but she begs him to leave her alone.
Sam does not leave but instead he engages in sexual intercourse with Sue.
Even in a state in which both Ted and Sam could be prosecuted, 2 10
no prosecutor would pursue Example One over Example Two.2 11 Cases
are "sick" because they violate fundamental notions of what is right. At
times these notions are expressly spelled out by statute-society deems it
a greater harm for a teacher to molest a student or a parent to molest a
child. 21 2 Likewise, in the examples presented above, a boy who pressures and forces a girl with whom he is in a quasi-familial relationship is
more culpable and causes more harm than the boy who engages in voluntary intercourse with his girlfriend. Far from being "problematic," an
209 She reinforces this view by making no mention of how the "sick" cases should be
prioritized in relation to other cases after she spends several pages explaining various problems
with the test. See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 751-52, 767-71.
210 As has been demonstrated repeatedly, Example One could be prosecuted only in a few
states.
211 See NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS Assoc., supra note 171, at 197-203 (discussing charging
considerations). See also Phipps, supra note 14, at 96-97 (discussing factors affecting longterm adverse outcomes in child sexual abuse victims).
212 See NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS Assoc., supra note 171, at 223-26 (discussing the need
to consider severity in the context of plea negotiations).
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approach that recognizes differences in severity is absolutely essential in
the administration of justice in society.
3.

Summary

In contrast to Oberman's view that three prioritization strategies
reign, the only empirically defensible assertion (apart from the fact that
prosecutors consider severity in prioritizing cases) is that there is no uniform national approach to prosecuting cases involving an adolescent who
willingly engages in sexual activity with another adolescent. The most
obvious reason for a lack of national standardization is that such activity
is not an offense in most states. Even in those states in which it is an
offense, it is not a problem because virtually no prosecutors pursue cases
of fully voluntary sexual acts between juveniles.
If the conduct at issue is limited to coercive sexual activity between
juveniles, there is likewise no evidence that any particular strategy for
prioritizing cases prevails. If any trend can be identified, it would be the
trend to approach cases of child sexual abuse from a multi-disciplinary
team perspective. 213 That is, rather than focusing on criteria such as
whether a girl is pregnant, a team comprised of a law enforcement officer, social services investigator, and prosecutor weighs all the evidence
and the law in determining whether to prosecute an individual. 21 4 There
is no empirical evidence that the use of team assessment is uniform, but
if one is looking at national trends, the team approach is more wide21 5
spread than the prioritization criteria identified by Oberman.
C.

MISPLACED REFORM

In light of Oberman's view that an entire class of victims is "wholly
unprotected," 21 6 and her call to reformulate 2 17 and reconfigure 2 18 the
213 See Jerome R. Kolbo & Edith Strong, MultidisciplinaryTeam Approaches to the Investigation and Resolution of Child Abuse and Neglect: A National Survey, 2 CHILD MALTREATMENT 61 (1997). In response to Kolko and Strong's survey, sixty-six percent of states
reported that they had "statewide participation" in a multidisciplinary response to child abuse
and neglect. Id. at 64. The researchers also found that states vary greatly in the composition
and function of teams. Id. at 67-70.
214 The National District Attorneys Association child abuse prosecution manual emphasized the team approach in its 1993 manual. NAT'L DIST. ATrORNEYS Assoc., supra note 171,
at 511-33. See also DONNA PENCE & CHARLES WILSON, TEAM INVESTIGATION OF CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE 121-35 (1994) (discussing factors a multi-disciplinary team should examine in
assessing a case).
215 Oberman identifies an "innovative" Wisconsin project that has a significant team component. See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 774-75.
216 Id. at 752; see also id. at 706-07 (arguing that she will "attempt to repair the fault
lines in the construction and implementation of contemporary statutory rape laws").
217 Id. at 707.

218 Girls in the Master's House, supra note 15, at 825 (stating that "[t]hese laws must be
reconfigured from their cores").
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criminal law, one would expect a radical revolution in the substantive
law itself. Yet her solutions are almost entirely procedural, with virtually
no concrete reforms to the substantive law. 2 19 Thus, Oberman's recommendations fall far short of the wholesale revision of statutory rape law
she sets out to create.
This reconfiguration fails on three levels. First, Oberman's proposal to rely on strict liability offenses would require reversal of current
law in most states and would amount to a significant step backward
rather than forward. 220 Second, her proposal to modify sentencing structures avoids the fundamental problem and does not remedy it. Third, her
recommendations concerning victim involvement are likely to harm
rather than help victims.
1. Reversing the Law
In calling for advocates to "reclaim" and "enlist" statutory rape
laws, Oberman urges states to use strict liability statutory rape laws to
prosecute sexual activity between teenagers. 2 2 1 Although she apparently
believes there are times when these laws should be used to prosecute
cases of voluntary sex, 222 her call primarily appears to be for the use of a
strict liability offense to prosecute cases falling in the "gray" area that
would not be covered by child sexual abuse or rape statutes. 223 Thus, the
essence of her recommendation is that prosecutors use strict liability
child sexual abuse offenses to regulate sexual behavior between adolescents of comparable age. In this way, according to her argument, cases
involving subtle coercion or manipulation can be pursued when prosecution under a traditional rape statute would be difficult or impossible.
However, because the criminal statutes in most states do not apply
to voluntary sexual activity between teenagers, the unstated but unavoidable first step that must be taken to implement Oberman's recommendation is to amend the law in thirty-eight states to allow for prosecution of
teenagers who engage in voluntary sex with each other. Seen in this
light, Oberman's reconfiguration becomes a call for a revocation of the
law in three-fourths of the states. This reversal of existing law is misguided for several reasons.
219 Implicit in her approach is a need for the substantive law to be changed in a majority

of states. However, this is not a recommendation she expressly makes, since she presumes the
law already is as she would have it be.
220 See supra notes 113-17 for discussion of the modem trend to create age differentials
and not criminalize voluntary sexual activity between teenagers.
221 See Girls in the Master's House, supra note 15, at 825.
222 See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.

223 Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 750; Turning Girls into Women, supra
note 15, at 73.
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Oberman's Reconfiguration Gives Overbroad Discretion to
Prosecutors

A significant problem with using strict liability offenses in the manner Oberman advocates is that it gives prosecutors carte blanche to define the law as applied to teenagers. When considering how to charge a
criminal act, prosecutors routinely assess the law, the evidence, and the
likelihood of conviction. Based on the available evidence, the prosecutor
may determine to proceed to trial or accept a plea on a lesser offense
when a greater offense could conceivably be proven. This is an everyday, routine exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 224 A vital limit on this
discretion, though, is that the underlying conduct is made criminal by
statute and the prosecutor exercises discretion only in terms of which
criminal offense to apply to the conduct.
The discretion Oberman advocates, however, is of a categorically
different type. Under her proposal, an individual prosecutor has complete discretion to determine when a "gray area" case has crossed an
undefined line into criminal behavior. Within a single state, one county
prosecutor may believe that all voluntary sex between teenagers is wrong
and vigorously prosecute all cases brought to her attention. A prosecutor
in an adjoining county, however, might create a per se rule that any time
a victim says "no," such cases are always prosecuted. And yet another
county prosecutor may decide to prosecute only cases in which the female makes a prompt outcry and immediately tells a third party that sex
was coerced.
Thus, rather than deciding which offense to apply to given conduct,
the prosecutor would be deciding whether a crime even exists. Under the
general umbrella of statutory rape law, prosecutors would be defining
crimes on a case-by-case basis rather than on the basis of objective criteria established by a state legislature.
An obvious implication of such overly broad discretion is that it
would unnecessarily open the door to improper considerations in the
charging decision. The Supreme Court of Vermont identified precisely
225 In In re G. T.,226
this concern when interpreting its statutory rape law.
the court stated that the prosecutor was "candid" in explaining that he
charged the juvenile under the strict liability offense rather than the stat224 For a discussion of prosecutorial discretion, see Robert L. Misner, Recasting
ProsecutorialDiscretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996). Another proponent of
such broad discretion recognizes the inherent dangers, and cautions that objective criteria must
be established within a prosecutor's office. See Nowack, supra note 170, at 874 (identifying
the need for charging criteria "that can be applied evenly and fairly"). If, however, a prosecutor can create objective criteria for prosecuting, a legislature should be able to create these
criteria in the charging statute so that the law is defined equally throughout a state.
225 See In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301 (Vt. 2001).
226 Id.
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ute requiring proof of lack of consent, explaining that he did so because
"it creates a strict liability offense which is easy to prove." 227 The court
criticized this approach:
[T]he prosecutor determines what crime the juvenile has
committed, but charges in such a way as to ensure that
the juvenile never has the opportunity to show that he or
she did not commit the crime found by the prosecutor..
[T]he selective enforcement of the underlying statute
has the hallmarks that other courts have relied upon to
22 8
find discriminatory prosecution.
It is not difficult to foresee how perceptions of racially disparate
enforcement and political influence would be exacerbated if prosecutors
were to be given such wide latitude that they, in effect, were defining the
criminal law. 229 Indeed, the Vermont court noted as much when it
stated: "It is one thing to give discretion in enforcing a legislatively defined crime; it is quite another to give to prosecutors the power to define
'230
the crime.
b.

Oberman's Reconfiguration Does Not Help Prioritize Cases

Oberman's recommendation that states return to broad use of strict
liability offenses does not help prioritize cases for prosecution. In Regulating ConsensualSex, Oberman rests upon the factual premise that there
are 7.5 million cases of statutory rape annually, a "staggering" and
"daunting" number, and that prosecutors use inappropriate guidelines in
deciding which of those cases to prosecute. However, her reform proposal does not resolve the fundamental problem of how prosecutors should
prioritize cases. While she criticizes what she perceives to be prosecutors' current guidelines, she provides no guidelines of her own.
The only part of her proposal that possibly could help prioritize
cases is the suggestion that victims participate in sentencing decisions.
Unfortunately, though, this recommendation is not entirely clear. At
times it appears that Oberman is recommending that prosecutors charge
all 7.5 million cases and then involve victims at the sentencing stage.
Thus, in her initial description of her proposal, she states: "Under my
scheme, the general rule would be that, for a first offense, the victim
would be permitted to determine whether the perpetrator should receive
227 Id. at 306.
228 Id.

229 For an argument that prosecutorial discretion is exercised in a manner that disproportionately impacts minorities, see Paul Butler, Starr Is to Clinton as Regular ProsecutorsAre to
Blacks, 40 B.C. L. REV. 705 (1999).

230 In re G.T., 758 A.2d at 306.
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an opportunity for a suspended sentence."'2 3 1 Although she does not
specify how this scheme would work, presumably prosecutors would
charge out all cases and the victims would then decide when to allow a
suspended sentence.
At other times, Oberman appears to be suggesting that prosecutors
charge only those cases in which a victim asks the prosecutor to press
charges. 232 For example, she indicates she would "requir[e] the victim's
cooperation in order to proceed,"233 and that under her proposal, "the
young person would be permitted to decide for herself whether the relationship in which she was engaged was consensual. ' '234 If indeed she is
proposing that cases not be charged without victim approval, it is entirely
likely that the number of prosecutions would go down rather than up.
Since prosecutors often must proceed in spite of a victim's objection, it is
likely that many cases would not go forward if victim cooperation is
235
required.
Regardless of how she intends her proposal to work, Oberman's
suggestion to involve victims does not aid prosecutors in prioritizing
cases. Oberman provides no criteria for prosecutors to use in assessing
whether the victim's recommendation is voluntary rather than the result
of parental pressure; she provides no clear statements of circumstances
under which a victim's participation would not be required; and she provides no indication of what factual circumstances might give one case
priority over another. Without these criteria, it is difficult to see how her
recommendation helps prosecutors prioritize cases.
It is likewise hard to imagine that implementing Oberman's proposal would cause previously unknown victims to come forward. That is,
even if the substantive law were changed nationwide to allow wide
prosecutorial discretion and prosecutors adopted her recommendation to
reclaim these laws on behalf of teenage girls, it is highly unlikely that
this alone would cause scores of previously unknown victims to go to
prosecutors' offices and press charges. Without some additional massive
and systematic reforms-such as an infusion of money for training
mandatory reporters, investigators, and prosecutors-it is improbable
this proposal would result in any practical change in the way cases make
it to a prosecutor's desk.
231 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 778.
232 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 781 (stating that her approach allows the adolescent "to decide for herself whether the relationship in which she was engaged
was consensual").
233 Id. at 781 (emphasis added).
234 Id. (emphasis added).
235 See NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS Assoc., supra note 171, at 343.
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Oberman's Reconfiguration Makes the Law Vague

Oberman avoids focusing on definitional matters or objective criteria in sex crimes statutes, arguing that a focus on "objective factors" will
"saddle[ ] statutory rape law with all of the problems of prosecuting acquaintance rape." Since the problems with prosecuting acquaintance
rapes are problems of objective proof (how consent is defined and then
how it is proven in court), she believes the best way to avoid the
problems of definitions and problems of proof is to use a strict liability
236
crime.
Her proposal apparently would work as follows. First, a statute
would define a strict liability criminal offense: "A male who has sexual
intercourse with a female under the age of consent commits an offense."
Second, a statute would establish that a teenage girl would decide
whether the defendant receives a suspended sentence. 237 If the girl does
not make a decision, the prosecutor would determine whether to offer a
suspended sentence. 238 Thus, if the girls speaks, her decision is determinative; if she does not speak, the prosecutor decides. Although this proposal would accomplish the goal of empowering some girls, its
subjectivity also would result in an extraordinarily vague criminal
offense.
Consider Examples One and Two again. Assume that the day after
engaging in sexual intercourse with Ted, Tina tells several friends that
she voluntarily engaged in sexual intercourse with Ted. Tina and Ted
publicly profess their love, and Tina repeatedly tells friends she thinks
they will get married after they graduate. They continue a sexual relationship for several months, but eventually they break up. At this point,
Tina feels shame for her sexual activity with Ted, and she pursues criminal charges against him. He is prosecuted, and Tina does not recommend
a suspended sentence. Under Oberman's proposal, Ted's acts become a
serious crime based on Tina's change of heart.
Likewise, the victim in Example Two is not assured of protection.
If Sue's mother does not want the relationship with her boyfriend disrupted, she is likely to place inordinate pressure on Sue to drop any criminal proceedings. Thus, so long as Sue tells the prosecutor that she
desires a suspended sentence for Sam, he is likely to receive little or no
punishment for his conduct. By not defining the wrongful conduct and
instead leaving it up to the victim, Oberman's proposed statutory scheme
236 Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 752.
237 See id. at 777-79 (discussion under the heading of "Statutory Reform"). Or perhaps
the statute would allow the victim to make the decision at the charging stage. See supra notes

232-35 and accompanying text.
238 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 778-79.
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fails to protect Sue and does not teach Sam that his conduct is
unacceptable.
d.

Oberman's Reconfiguration Does Not Ensure Convictions

In arguing for an expanded use of the strict liability offense in the
context of acquaintance rape, Oberman argues that prosecutors may be
reluctant to prosecute cases of forcible rape because of a "society's tendency to blame the victim. '239 The solution, she states, is to charge the
rapist with statutory rape and "thus be assured of a conviction. '240 She
argues that statutory rape laws "provide a de facto stop gap" and allow
conviction of one who otherwise might escape conviction "because of
deep-seated societal norms that undermine convictions. 24 1
However, changing the label of the offense-and even changing the
elements of the offense-will not change the underlying societal views
that affect prosecutorial discretion and jury deliberations. 242 Thus, a societal tendency to blame the victim will affect a prosecution for statutory
rape just as it would affect a prosecution for forcible rape. A prosecutor
who believes a victim seduced a defendant or engaged in sexual activity
voluntarily will exercise her discretion not to prosecute, even if the offense is "statutory rape" rather than "forcible rape." Likewise, if a juror
believes that most accusations of rape are false, prosecutors will have a
difficult time convincing that juror even if the charge is "statutory
rape."2 43
In sum, the substantive criminal law must be more precise than
Oberman's proposal allows. If the conduct is truly of the type that deserves strict liability status, then it should be enforced consistently whenever the elements of the statutory offense are met. Alternatively, if
something other than the act of sexual intercourse is the objectionable
conduct (e.g., use of coercion), then that conduct must be defined. Because the offense as construed by Oberman is neither a consistently-enforced strict liability offense nor a well-defined nonconsensual offense,
the crime becomes pliable and ever-changing. To create such a subjec-

239 See Girls in the Master's House, supra note 15, at 820.
240 See id.

241 See id. at 821.
242 See I PAUL DEROHANNESIAN, SEXUAL ASSAULT TRIALS 147 (2d ed. 1998) ("Most
jurors will make decision based upon feelings, emotions, and previously held beliefs, and not
just upon the facts through a rational process.").

243 See David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 429-30 (2000)

(arguing that, in the context acquaintance rape cases, changing the offense from "rape" to
"assault" is not likely to affect a jury's assessment).
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tive, undefined offense is objectionable both as a matter of public policy
244
and as a matter of constitutional law.
2.

Diluting the Punishment

After demonstrating the problems with statutory rape laws, highlighting the need for reform, and presenting her view of the rationale to
support a reformed system, Oberman presents the "law reforms necessary to effectuate that rationale. '245 She promises a "practical solution" 246 and a "comprehensive approach" 247 that will "repair the fault
lines in the construction and implementation of contemporary statutory
rape laws. '2 4 8 The first step in this process, she argues, is to modify
sentencing schemes. As she states it: "I begin my reform by urging criminal justice officials to employ the broad range of options available under
'249
the law in crafting punishments for those guilty of statutory rape.
While prosecutors pursuing the cases with which she is concerned
certainly should look at rehabilitation rather than incarceration, this reform proposal falls far short of Oberman's stated goal of comprehensive
reform. The two main issues raised by Oberman's criticism call for clarified definition of the underlying offense and a revision of how prosecutors prioritize cases. Altering sentencing schemes addresses neither of
these problems.
Oberman continues by making one of the most curious comments in
her article. She states:
In an environment saturated with messages encouraging
the sexual objectification of young women, it is easy to
understand why boys and men might pursue their own
sexual gratification at the expense of their partner. Because sex for adolescents is somewhat experimental in
nature, it is important to acknowledge that mistakes will
occur.

250

After attempting to qualify what she means by "mistakes," Oberman
concludes: "Thus, to the extent that the law ignores the learning curve at
1
work in adolescent sexual encounters, it may be too harsh." '25
244 See In re G.T., 758 A.2d at 306 (noting potential equal protection concerns with selective prosecution). See generally I WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW § 2.3, at 126-35 (1986).
245 Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 754.
246 Id. at 753.
247 See id. at 775 (stating that none of the other reform proposals "offers a comprehensive

approach" and they all "fall somewhat short").
248 Id. at 707.
249 Id. at 776.
250 Id.
251 Id.

at 777.

2003]

MISDIRECTED REFORM

419

That is, a teenage boy who incorrectly believes a teenage girl is
consenting to sex should still be held liable, but should be treated leniently if it is evident that his conduct is the result of a "mistake" or part of
the "learning curve." While not going so far as to say that a mistake of
fact should remove criminal liability, 252 she argues that a mistake of fact
as to a girl's consent should mitigate his sentence.
This argument presents substantial inconsistencies. The essence of
a strict liability offense is that a defendant's state of mind is irrelevant.
That is, the wrongful conduct is the defendant's act of sexual intercourse
with an underage minor-the fact that a victim appears to consent is not
relevant. It follows, then, that punishment should respond to the underlying wrongful conduct-the sex act that is per se illegal-without consideration of whether the defendant was "mistaken" as to the victim's
consent.253 The argument that the defendant's state of mind becomes
relevant at sentencing is at odds with the purpose of the strict liability
offense, which is to punish the wrongful conduct-sexual intercourse
with an underage minor.
Alternatively, if Oberman is arguing that the underlying wrongful
conduct targeted by the offense is the use of coercion, then describing the
conduct as a "mistake" or part of a "learning curve" is troublesome. If
coercion is the issue, then it needs to be recognized as exploitive and
wrongful, and indeed, it ought to be labeled as rape. Thus, although
Oberman argues that "clear lines" and "certain consequences" need to be
established, 254 her conflicting discussion concerning mental states makes
these lines and consequences far from certain.
3.

Dis-empowering Victims

After establishing her preliminary recommendation concerning sentencing, Oberman reaches the crux of her reform proposal-allowing female victims to make sentencing (and perhaps charging) determinations.
Again, it must be emphasized that this recommendation is not simply that
teenagers be heard, as in victims' rights legislation. Rather, Oberman
states the victim should "be permitted to determine whether the perpetra252 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1, at
575 (1986) ("[T]he basic rule is extremely simple: ignorance or mistake of fact or law is a
defense when it negatives the existence of a mental state essential to the crime charged").
253 Feinberg makes a similar criticism of a Washington sentencing scheme. He states:
"This must be one of the rare places in the law where voluntariness that is insufficient to make
consent valid nevertheless has other legal effects, in this case mitigating ones." FEINBERG,
supra note 2, at 330.
254 On the entire issue, Oberman is not at all clear. After stating that "mistakes will
occur," Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 776, she almost immediately turns
around to say that "the failure to condemn 'mistakes' involving nonvoluntary sex with an
underage partner is.. pernicious. Lenience in such cases only encourages girls to internalize a
sexual script ... ." Id. at 777.
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tor should receive an opportunity for a suspended sentence," 25 5 and "to
decidefor herselfwhether the relationship in which she was engaged was
consensual. ' 256 Thus, this proposal places a great deal of responsibility
on the girl not just to advise, but to determine whether a prosecution will
go forward.
Oberman qualifies this recommendation for a subset of cases that
she calls "per se violations. '257 In these cases-incest, abuse of authority, and very young victims-the victim's cooperation would not be necessary. 258 She goes on to identify numerous reasons why victims may
not cooperate with prosecutors, and this discussion apparently is not limited to the "per se violations," but to all cases.25 9 Further, Oberman discusses "no drop" policies used in cases of domestic violence, stating that
"victims of statutory rape need at least as much support as do the victims
of domestic violence. '2 60 To this extent, Oberman appears to be arguing
that prosecutors should proceed regardless of the victim's willingness to
prosecute.
Thus, it becomes unclear whether Oberman is arguing that girls
should "determine," 26 ' or should "play[ ] a role in determining" the prosecution.2 62 It seems that the former role would be determinative and the
latter would be advisory. If she is recommending only that girls be
heard, this proposal represents no meaningful advance over existing victims rights legislation present in most states. 263 Because her proposal
would lose all force were this to be her argument, I interpret Oberman as
proposing that a victim's view as to whether to impose a suspended sentence should be determinative (or, alternatively, that the victim's decision on whether to prosecute should be decisive).
Assuming that Oberman intends for the victim to have a determinative voice in the decision to impose a suspended sentence or to prosecute,
this recommendation is highly problematic. At a basic level, it is inconsistent with Oberman's view of girls as fundamentally incapable of making meaningful decisions on important matters-if a girl is not capable of
consenting to sex, how can she have the capacity to direct a criminal
255 Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 778 (emphasis added).
256 Id. at 781 (emphasis added).
257 See id. at 779.
258 Id.
259 See id. at 779-81.
260 Id. at 780.
261 See id. at 778.
262 See id. at 781.
263 See, e.g., Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participationin the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years After the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEw ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 21, 32 n.49 (1999) (listing states); Mary Margaret Giannini, Note,
The Swinging Pendulum of Victims' Rights: The Enforceability of Indiana's Victims' Rights
Laws, 34 IND. L. REV. 1157 n.2 (2001) (listing states).
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prosecution? 264 Worse yet, this recommendation shifts from prosecutor

to victim the burden of making one of the most critical societal decisions-when and how to prosecute a crime. In contrast to victims' rights
legislation that appropriately requires judges and prosecutors to take a
victim's view into account, Oberman's recommendation places the responsibility for the outcome entirely on a victim's shoulders.
The following examples demonstrate the problems with this
approach:
Example Three. Fifteen-year-old Joe boasts that he has
had sex with ten different girls in his high school. Sally,
a fifteen-year-old in Joe's high school class, is infatuated
with Joe. One evening she goes to his house to watch a
movie. While there, he fondles her and starts to take her
clothes off. She tells him "I really don't want to do
this," but she does not want to be rejected so she does
not stop him from proceeding to sexual intercourse.
Sally craves Joe's attention, and she does not want to
prosecute him. Joe does not have any affection for
Sally, but he plans to engage in further sexual activity
with her whenever he can. Sally's parents know that she
265
had sex with Joe, but they don't care.
Example Four. Fifteen-year-old Jane and fifteen-yearold Bill begin dating and fall in love. Bill treats Jane
with great respect and for the first six months of their
relationship they do not engage in sexual intercourse.
After six months, they decide their love is lasting and
they begin a sexual relationship that they both describe
as fully consensual. Jane's father finds out about her
sexual activity with Bill and he is outraged. Jane's father is a law professor and he insists that the prosecutor
pursue criminal charges. While not physically abusive,
Jane's father is authoritarian in the home and Jane has
always been entirely submissive to her father's will. Because she does not have the strength to go against her
father's wishes, Jane tells the prosecutor not to allow a
suspended sentence for Bill.
These examples demonstrate how placing the burden on the victim
can exacerbate a girl's powerlessness. Far from helping the girls in these
264 See Turning Girls into Women, supra note 15, at 69.
265 For purposes of this hypothetical, it must be assumed that this sexual act is reported to
law enforcement, investigated, and considered by the prosecutor even though the victim is

uncooperative.
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cases, placing the decision to prosecute on the shoulders of the victims
would further several ills. Jane's subordination to her father is reinforced
while her autonomy is not respected in making what she deems to be
mature decisions about her personal relationships. Indeed, her submissive role is perpetuated by placing her in the impossible position where
she must overcome an overbearing father in order to avoid punishing her
boyfriend.
Likewise, Sally runs the risk of remaining under the control of her
rapist. Even though all the evidence would tell an objective observer that
Joe is manipulative and does not care for Sally's feelings, Sally may still
wish to please him because she craves his attention. This type of victim
is not likely to cooperate with a prosecutor even though she is most in
need of protection. Under Oberman's proposal, if this victim indicates
that she does not want to pursue charges or insists on a suspended sentence, then apparently the prosecutor would be bound by the victim's
wishes. Far from empowering the victim, this girl's powerlessness is
exacerbated when she bears the responsibility of making prosecutorial
decisions.
Adding one more twist to this example demonstrates yet an even
more serious problem with Oberman's configuration. Assume that Sally
is a victim of intrafamilial sexual abuse perpetrated by her father. It is
extremely common for sexual abuse victims to engage in sexually promiscuous behavior and to be revictimized, 266 thus helping explain her
submission to Joe. Yet Sally's prior abuse and the accompanying family
dynamics make her less likely to press charges against Joe.
Many of these dynamics are further illustrated by the tragically real
case of State v. Rife. 2 6 7 In Rife, a sixteen-year-old girl's mother
"kicked" her daughter out of the house and, subsequently, a forty-nineyear old man took the girl in. 268 In dissenting from the majority's view
that a downward departure in sentencing could be made on the basis of
the girl's voluntary participation, Judge Thompson points out the exploitive nature of the relationship:
During his trial, the minor testified that she and Rife had
sex at least 60 times before he was appointed her guardian and at least 30 times after he was appointed her
guardian. She also stated that Rife had proposed to her
and they were to be married when she turned 18. She
admitted introducing herself as his fianc6e. Moreover,
266 See William N. Friedrich et al., Child Sexual Behavior Inventory: Normative, Psychiatric and Sexual Abuse Comparisons, 6 CHILD MALTREATMENT 37 (2001).
267 733 So. 2d 541 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (en banc), affirmed, State v. Rife, 2001 WL

359697 (Fla. 2001) (unpublished opinion).
268 See Rife, 733 So. 2d at 548 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
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she testified that she and Rife drank beer and smoked
marijuana together, and that she liked and trusted him in
spite of his overbearing behavior: he would not allow
her to talk with her male friends and would not permit
her to visit with any friends unless he approved them.
He also threatened her. She finally reported that he was
having sex with her when she could no longer tolerate
his domination, and when he would not allow her to
have a kitten, which was given to her by a police
officer.

26 9

Abundant literature demonstrates how victims often have a difficult
time escaping abusive relationships. 270 Given the degree of power and
control Rife had over his victim, it is conceivable that his control could
have continued through the court process. It is likewise foreseeable that
under Oberman's proposal, the victim would make the unwise decision
to allow a deferred prosecution with no incarceration. Rather than being
empowered to control her own sexual decision, this girl would be further
27
subjected to the controlling power of an adult man. '
As the foregoing demonstrates, placing prosecutorial decisions on
victims presents the real risk that a girl's weakness will be reinforced,
this time in relation to an overbearing father or a manipulative perpetrator. Oberman's proposal might protect teenagers who are fully empowered and in ideal family situations, but it fails to provide a mechanism for
protecting the teenager who is afraid, harassed, or under the influence of
her offender.
Thus, the very population that Oberman claims is left out of the
current system-the disempowered and most helpless-would only be
further left out under her proposal. A girl from a well-educated and upper-income family is likely to have the support and resources to pursue a
criminal case, while the lower-income, disenfranchised girl is not likely
to gain access to a prosecutor. Thus, the proposed reform would serve
only to perpetuate a system in which the concerns of the wealthy and
powerful are heeded while the voice of the powerless is ignored.

269 Id. at 548-49.
270 See, e.g., David Finkelhor & Angela Browne, The Traumatic Impact of Child Sexual
Abuse: A Conceptualization,55 AMER. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 530 (1985).
271 Perhaps Oberman would consider this in the category of "per se violations," but, perhaps not. See Regulating ConsensualSex, supra note 15, at 779. She does not list a wide age
disparity as one of the factors and, indeed, disparages the use of an age differential as a charging criteria elsewhere in her article.
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Gender Exclusivity

A final aspect of Oberman's reform proposal that needs to be addressed is the gender exclusivity of her recommendations. Oberman's
central concern is that girls are uniquely vulnerable to sexual exploitation
and that boys are uniquely prone to exploit vulnerable girls. She uses
case studies 272 as well as social science literature to show how girls suffer from depression and anxiety more than boys, are more likely to attempt suicide, demonstrate "passive-aggressive" efforts to "communicate
their desperation," and are rife with "self-doubt, insecurity and depression."'273 Although she recognizes that these traits are not uniform
among all girls, she uses the literature to demonstrate why girls are particularly vulnerable and incapable of voluntarily consenting to sexual ac274
tivity with boys.
Her argument proceeds as follows. Girls are pressured by society to
agree to engage in sexual activity with same-age boys, but their consent
often is not meaningful. 275 Even though the sexual encounter may not
rise to the level of being legally coercive, it is nonetheless problematic
because it is not wholly voluntary. 276 For this reason, statutory rape laws
should be used to prosecute cases involving female victims that fall into
this "gray" area.2 77 In this way, prosecutors can use the law to identify
problematic sexual behavior that does not rise to the level of nonconsensual.278 However, her articles make clear that the laws should be used
only in a gender exclusive manner, protecting girls from exploitation by
boys.

279

Oberman's arguments often mirror the view expressed under the
discredited patriarchal system 2 80 that numerous commentators-including Oberman-roundly and rightly criticize. 28 1 For example, her assertion that "girls consent to sex for foolish and mistaken reasons" '282 does
272 See id. at 718-33.
273 Id. at 714-15.

274 See Turning Girls into Women, supra note 15, at 68-70.
275 Id. at 69.
276 Id. at 69-70.

277 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 733.
278 See Girls in the Master's House, supra note 15, at 820-21.
279 The titles alone make this clear: Girls in the Master's House: Of Protection, Patriarchy and the Potentialfor Using the Master's Tools to Reconfigure Statutory Rape Law;
Turning Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law.
280

For examples of sexist language, see Phipps, supra note 14, at 34-37.

281 See Girls in the Master's House, supra note 15, at 802-03; Turning Girls into Women,

supra note 15, at 23-27.
282 Turning Girls into Women, supra note 15, at 69. See also id. at 22 (Scientists "call[]

into question the presumption that girls are fully capable of protecting themselves .. ");
Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 723 (discussing a girl's "inability to protect
herself against being coerced to participate"); id. at 782 ("Immaturity and a lack of experience
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not differ drastically from the view that girls are "unable to appreciate
283
the enormity of this [sexual] offense.
Such statements might be understandable if used to demonstrate underlying problems or sociological dynamics that could then be used to
help formulate a definition of consent, a rape shield statute, or another
discrete problem. Commentators regularly make good use of the social
science data in developing novel recommendations. 2 84 However, Oberman uses the social science literature to draw categorical and stereotypical pictures of girls, and, from this, to create a per se rule that a teenage
girl is not capable of meaningfully agreeing to sexual activity with a
male peer. 285 Such a gender-exclusive approach is ill advised for three
reasons.
First, advancing gender stereotypes does not help girls. Because the
thrust of Oberman's proposed reform is that strict liability offenses
should be used to protect the girls, her reform will occur only with the
cooperation of prosecutors. Yet the message she is sending to these
prosecutors is that girls are inherently weak and are not capable of making important decisions, thus threatening to reinforce existing stereotypical views of females and encourage paternalistic responses by
prosecutors.
Second, advancing gender stereotypes is harmful to male victims.
Literature on child sexual abuse makes it clear that a substantial number
of boys are sexually abused. In one study, for example, twelve percent
of boys in grades six through twelve reported experiencing unwanted

not only render a girl vulnerable to coercion in a sexual encounter, it may also render her more
likely to term the encounter Inonconsensual.' ").
283 Nider v. Commonwealth, 131 S.W. 1024, 1027 (Ky. Ct. App. 1910).
284 See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 8; Lynn M. Phillips, Recasting Consent: Agency and
Victimization in Adult-Teen Relationships, in NEW VERSIONS OF VICTIMS: FEMINISTS STRUG-

GLE WITH THE CONCEPT 83, 88-99 (Sharon Lamb, ed. 1999); SCHULHOFER, supra note 8;
CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM (1992).
285 Research demonstrates the difficulty in assessing whether a teenager's consent to sexual activity is meaningful. Pregnant girls tend to describe themselves as capable of making a
decision about whether to engage in sexual activity. See Joanna Gregson Higginson, Defining,
Excusing, and Justifying Deviance: Teen Mothers' Accounts for Statutory Rape, 22 SYMBOLIC
INTERACTION 25 (1999). Higginson talked with teenage mothers about their ability to consent
to sexual activity with older males. Most of them described their relationships with men as
fully voluntary.
Researcher Lynn Phillips provides similar evidence of what teenage girls say about their
sexual activity, but she demonstrates the complexity in assessing whether conduct is consensual. While the adolescents she interviewed tended to indicate that they were capable of making responsible decisions, adult women said, in retrospect, that significant power imbalances
were present in their relationships as teenagers. See Lynn M. Phillips, Recasting Consent:
Agency and Victimization in Adult-Teen Relationships, in NEW VERSIONS OF VICTIMS: FEMINISTS STRUGGLE WITH THE CONCEPT 83, 88-99 (Sharon Lamb, ed. 1999).
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sex. 286 Of these, approximately twelve percent involved sex that the re-

searchers classified as child abuse, and eight percent involved force. 287
It is clear that both pre-pubertal and post-pubertal boys experience sexual
activity that they do not want. Gender exclusive treatment of child sexual abuse will result in boys who are not protected from exploitation.
Third, gender exclusive language is not necessary. Since the problem of coercive sexual activity can be addressed in gender inclusive language that would protect boys as well as girls, there is no need to do
otherwise.
In the context of adult rape, feminist literature has forged the way to
legal reform. 2 88 Women are overwhelmingly the victims of rape, and
men are overwhelmingly the perpetrators. 289 Men historically have dominated positions of political power, failing over the course of centuries to
enact strong protections for rape victims. Clearly, without strong feminist advocacy, rape statutes never would have been reformed. When the
subject involves defining substantive crimes against adolescents, though,
it must be recognized that pre-pubescent boys are victims of sexual abuse
at a disturbing rate and, even as they develop through adolescence, boys
continue to be sexually victimized. 290 While it is entirely appropriate to
recognize the unique difficulties faced by adolescent girls, the focus of
legislative reform involving teenagers should be on adolescents as a
whole, not on boys or girls exclusively.
D.

SUMMARY

Although Oberman sets out to "repair the fault lines in the construction and implementation of contemporary statutory rape laws," 29 1 she
fails to establish that these fault lines exist. While she demonstrates that
286 Pamela I. Erickson & Andrea J. Rapkin, Unwanted Sexual Experiences Among Middle
and High School Youth, 12 J. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH 319, 320 (1991). In this study, researchers asked: "Did you ever have a sexual experience (or sexual intercourse) with someone
when you did not want to?" Among males, approximately one-third of the sex classified as
"1unwanted" was described by the men to be sex that was later regretted. Id. Thus, in this
study, unwanted is not necessarily forced or non-voluntary sex.
287 Id.

288 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 29-33.
289 See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 2 (1997)

(reporting that ninety-

nine percent of perpetrators are male and ninety-two percent of victims are female). This
report does not separate acts that occurred during childhood from acts of nonconsensual adult
rape, so it is likely the rates of victimization of adult males is even lower. See also PATRICIA
TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE,
INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 14 (2000). Tjaden & Thoennes estimate that three percent of men and 17.6 percent of women are raped during their

lifetime. Again, however, this figure includes childhood victimization, so it does not provide a
precise number of males who are victims of forcible or nonconsensual rape as adults.
290 See Erickson & Rapkin, supra note 285, at 321.
291 Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 706-07.
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investigators and prosecutors at times make poor decisions on whether to
enforce existing law, she does not establish that the substantive criminal
law itself is fundamentally flawed, nor does she provide persuasive evidence that, nationwide, prosecutors systematically use improper mechanisms for screening and prioritizing cases. 292 Further, by focusing her
reform proposal on an overbroad use of a strict liability criminal law to
address a discrete type of wrongful behavior-coercing another into sexual acts-Oberman selects the wrong remedy to the problem. She then
selects inappropriate agents-the victims themselves-to carry out the
reform. In the end, therefore, the reform fails to empower victims but
rather threatens to perpetuate the very stereotypes and indiscriminate exercise of discretion that Oberman fears.
III.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

The difficulty in prosecuting coercive teenage sexual behavior is not
that prosecutors use improper mechanisms for screening and prioritizing
cases. Nor is it a problem of statutory construction. 293 Rather, the statutes in most states are fundamentally sound and the criteria used by prosecutors are sensible. Therefore, the criminal law in most states does not
need to be reconfigured or repaired.
At the same time, current statutes are not water tight, and thus there
continues to be room for improvement. The following recommendations
focus on a narrow range of issues that, if improved, could lead to meaningful reform that would better protect teenagers from coercive sexual
activity.
A.

CLARIFY THE ISSUE

Before forming a response to a perceived problem, it is first necessary to understand the problem. For this reason, the following section
establishes six categories of conduct that should be distinguished from
each other. The law applicable to each category is provided, along with
292 Abundant social science research makes it is clear that prosecution of sexual crimes
against teenagers is difficult because rape is under-reported and it is factually difficult to prove
at trial. See LEVESQUE, supra note 1, at 233 (summarizing the research as concluding that the

"vast majority of sexual assault victims do not report their victimization"). Child protection

and rape victim advocates have attempted to address the problem of low reporting for many
years, and numerous potential solutions have been advanced. See LEVESQUE, supra note 1, at
233-34; Rochelle F. Hanson et al., Factors Related to the Reporting of Childhood Rape, 23
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 559 (1999). Nonetheless, identifying cases remains a persistent
problem. See also Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 8, at 1220-63 (discussing problems in
reporting and problems of proof).
293 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 706-07 (stating that Oberman is
setting out to "repair the fault lines in the construction and implementation of contemporary

statutory rape laws").
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examples of legislation that address the conduct described in the
category.
1. Category One: A Pre-PubertalVictim and an Adult
294
Defendant
Without exception, the law in all fifty states prohibits sexual activity
between an adult and a pre-pubertal child. 29 5 While there is little debate
over the fundamental legitimacy of these statutes, 296 a persistent difficulty is establishing the age cut-off for the victims. Though the age cutoffs are not uniform around the country, they attempt to identify an age
at which children move out of puberty. 297 As a result, these statutes generally establish an age that is low enough-generally "under fourteen" or
"under thirteen"-that a reasonable person would not be mistaken about
the child's age.2 9 8 Thus, statutes addressing cases in this category reflect
a societal perception that pre-pubertal children should never be placed in
situations in which they must determine whether to enter into a sexual
relationship with an adult.
While force 299 or nonconsent is not an issue in these statutes, the
use of force typically may be considered an aggravating factor in sentencing. 3°° Therefore, an adult who molests a seven-year-old and injures
the child or uses a weapon in the process of molesting the child faces
enhanced punishment. It is not necessary in such cases to prove that the
294 In this section, I use the terms "victim" and "defendant" to represent the two
participants to sexual activity. In some cases, more accurate terms would be "potential
victims" and "potential defendants," since the conduct described is not necessarily criminal.
Likewise, a juvenile perpetrator is more accurately described as a "delinquent." Because use
of these terms in this context would be unnecessarily cumbersome, I use the labels "victim"
and "defendant" to provide easily understandable classifications.
295 For a thorough discussion of these laws, see Phipps, supra note 14, at 72-77.
296 An occasional case will test the limits of this category of cases. For example, a Maryland prosecutor received significant negative publicity for failing to prosecute a twenty-nineyear-old man for sexual acts with a thirteen-year-old. Because the two got married with the
permission of the girl's parents, the local prosecutor did not file charges. See Amy Argetsinger, Girl, 13, Marries Into Controversy, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1998, at AI. The following
year, the Maryland legislature passed a law prohibiting anyone under fourteen from marrying.
See Amy Argetsinger, Assembly Votes to Ban Some Teen Marriages, WASH. POST, April 11,
1990, at C4. The outrage prompted by this case as well as the prompt response by the legislature demonstrates that cases falling within Category One are nearly universally viewed as
inherently wrongful.
297 The drafters of the Model Penal Code, worried about the strict liability nature of the
offense, set the age at ten. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1. For a discussion of the Model
Penal Code approach, see Phipps, supra note 14, at 19-20.
298 See Phipps, supra note 14, at 58. States have not followed the lead of the Model Penal
Code in this area, opting instead to consider the stage of pre-pubescence more broadly.
299 I use the terms "force" and "coercion" to describe an act of force or coercion beyond
the coercion inherent in sexual activity between an adult (or older juvenile) and a younger
child. See Phipps, supra note 14, at 42, for additional discussion.
300 See id. at 70.
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child is an unwilling participant, only that the defendant uses a weapon
or in some other manner makes a display of force. Due to the young age
of the victims, a reasonable mistake of age defense does not exist for
30
offenses involving this category of victims. '
Oddly, Oberman mingles within her discussion victims who fall
within Category One. Most unusual is her use of a case from Chicago in
which the victims were eleven and twelve. 30 2 While she uses this as an
example of "intimidation and 'consensual' sex," there is generally no
dispute as to whether an eleven-year-old can enter into a consensual sexual relationship with an adult.30 3 The statutes around the country are
uniform on this point in identifying such conduct as child sexual
abuse, 30 4 and a discussion of "consensual sex between teenagers" needs
to recognize the difference between pre-pubertal and post-pubertal victims. While the law demonstrates some (though not much) flexibility
when an adult engages in sexual activity with a post-pubertal minor, the
law in every state is uncompromising toward an adult who engages in
30 5
sexual activity with a pre-pubertal child.
2.

Category Two: A Pre-PubertalVictim and a Defendant Who
Is a Post-PubertalMinor

As with sexual activity between a pre-pubertal child and an adult,
the law presumes that sexual activity between a pre-pubertal child and a
post-pubertal teenager is inherently harmful and, therefore, wrong re30 6
gardless of whether the participants claim the conduct is voluntary.
That is, if the post-pubertal defendant engages in sexual activity with a
pre-pubertal child, coercion is presumed based solely on the age difference between the two participants. In most states, these statutes make no
30 7
mention of a minimum perpetrator age or of an age differential,
though a few states require the older juvenile to be a specified number of
30 8
years older than the pre-pubertal child for an offense to be committed.
As with offenses involving adult defendants, the presence of physical
301 See Phipps, supra note 14, at 51-52.
302 See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 719-20. Oberman does not state
whether the perpetrators of the offenses were adults, indicating only that they were "older
teens." As mentioned previously, the failure of law enforcement to pursue this case is entirely
unjustifiable. Failure of officers to enforce the law, though, does not demonstrate that the law

itself is flawed.
303 See app. B (listing statutes).
304 In many states the thirteen-year-old victims in Hemme and Smith would fall into Category One as well, and the nineteen-year-old perpetrators would qualify as adults. See Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 15, at 721-24.
305 See Phipps, supra note 14, at 55-58.
306 See id. at 65-66 (discussing statutes).
307 See app. B.
308 See Phipps, supra note 14, at 66.
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force or coercion may be either an aggravating factor or a separate
309
offense.
The reasoning behind these statutes is that sexual activity by a prepubertal child is not a normal part of a child's development and, therefore, is inherently harmful regardless of the child's expression of willingness. 310 At times, prosecutions in this category raise concerns in the
public-particularly when the offense is very serious and the participants
are of similar age-but for the most part the victims in these cases are
young enough that any sexual activity with these children is accepted by
31
most people to be per se problematic. '
3.

Category Three: A Pre-PubertalVictim and a Pre-Pubertal
Defendant

As with Category Two, cases involving two pre-pubertal children
are viewed as inherently harmful. Although neither pre-pubertal child is
likely to be dealt with harshly by the criminal justice system, intervention
generally is deemed to be warranted because of the abnormality of children this age being sexually active. 31 2 Social science research demonstrates that pre-pubertal children are not likely to be engaged in sexual
activity with other pre-pubertal children, but rather, older adolescents or
adults prey on young children. 31 3 Indeed, sexual activity by young children often is a signal to child protection professionals that the child may
3 14
be a victim of abuse by an adult.

309 See id. at 70.
310 This reasoning is supported by the literature. See Jon A. Shaw et al., Child on Child
Sexual Abuse: PsychologicalPerspectives, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1591 (2000) (Young

children sexually abused by older children manifested the same level of adverse responses as
did young children sexually abused by adults.). See also Earl F. Martin & Marsha Kline
Pruett, The Juvenile Sex Offender and the Juvenile Justice System, 35 AMER. CRIM. L. REV.

279 (1998).
311 See, e.g., J.A.S. v. State, 705 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1998) (upholding the constitutionality
of criminal statute applied to two fifteen-year-old boys who engaged in sexual activity with
twelve-year-old girls).
312 See Susan M. Kole, Statute Protecting Minors in a Specified Age Range from Rape or
Other Sexual Activity as Applicable to Defendant Minor Within Protected Age Group, 18

A.L.R.5TH 856 (1994).
313 See Harold Leitenberg & Heidi Saltzman, A Statewide Survey of Age at First Intercoursefor Adolescent Females andAge of Their Male Partners:Relation to Other Risk Behav-

iors and Statutory Rape Implications, 29 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 203 (2000)
(discussing how the average age of partners is much older for children whose first sexual
intercourse is at a young age).
314 See William N. Friedrich et al., Child Sexual Behavior Inventory: Normative, Psychi-

atric and Sexual Abuse Comparisons, 6

CHILD MALTREATMENT

37 (2001).
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Category Four: A Post-PubertalVictim Who Is Below the
Age of Consent and an Adult Defendant

Categories Four, Five, and Six reflect the reality that the criminal
law treats post-pubescent victims differently from pre-pubescent victims.
While post-pubertal minors are still deemed incapable of consenting to
sexual activity with adults, 3 15 the fact that they have reached puberty
generally translates into lower criminal penalties for those who engage in
sexual activity with victims in this category. 316 Because the age of consent in the majority of states is sixteen, this means that the Category Four
317
victim generally is one aged fourteen or fifteen.
Just as in Category One, aggravating factors such as injury to the
victim, the use of a weapon, or the abuse of a position of authority may
increase the punishment. 3 18 Likewise, when force is used, prosecutors
may choose to charge under a forcible rape statute that provides greater
punishment. 319 In a small minority of states, a defendant may claim a
reasonable mistake of age defense when the victim is a post-pubertal
320
minor.
5.

Category Five: A Post-Pubertal Victim Who Is Below the Age
of Consent and a Post-PubertalDefendant Who Is Below
the Age of Consent

In most states, sexual activity between post-pubertal minors is excluded from the criminal law so long as both are willing participants,
regardless of whether one of them is below the age of consent. 32 1 As has
been discussed previously, most states accomplish this by creating an age
differential requirement-when two post-pubescent minors are of comparable age and the sexual activity is voluntary, then no criminal offense
315 See Phipps, supra note 14, at 58-62.
316 See id. at 72-77. In South Carolina, the law was changed in reaction to the arrest of
seventeen-year-old basketball star for engaging in sex with his fifteen-year-old girlfriend. (In
South Carolina, seventeen-year-olds are considered adults for purposes of the criminal law).

Apparently in recognition of the fact that sexual activity between teenagers of this age is not
unusual, the law was changed to substantially decrease the applicable sentence when the vic-

tim is fifteen. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45(C)(1) (Supp. 2001) (removing the offense from
the list of "most serious" offenses if the act involved consensual sex). For background on this
amendment, see Clif LeBlanc & Cindi Ross Scoppe, Young Love Wins Round in House, THE

STATE (Columbia, SC), May 2, 1996, at B4.
317 See appendix A for a list of the age of consent in each state.
318 See id. at 70.
319 See id. at 58-62.
320 See Phipps, supra note 14, at 52 n.219.
321 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
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is committed. 322 A few states prohibit all sexual activity between post323
pubertal minors when one of them is under the age of consent.
As with the other categories, when coercion is present in a sexual
encounter between teenagers in this age range, every state has a criminal
statute holding the coercive party criminally accountable. In such cases,
rather than presuming coercion based on the age of one of the participants, actual coercion-whether it be force or nonconsent-must be
324
proven.
6.

Category Six: A Post-PubertalVictim Who Is Below the Age
of Consent and a Post-PubertalMinor Defendant Who Is
at or Above the Age of Consent

The factor distinguishing Category Five from Category Six is the
age of the defendant. Category Five addresses juvenile defendants who
are under the age of consent (in most states, this translates into fourteenand fifteen-year-olds), while Category Six addresses those who are still
juveniles, yet are at or above the age of consent (in most states, defendants who are sixteen or seventeen). In spite of the fact that a fifteenyear-old defendant may be presumed incapable of consent while a sixteen-year-old might be deemed capable of consenting, this legal presumption does not translate into any practical difference in the way either
juvenile would be treated as a defendant. Thus, in most states, a fifteenyear-old defendant is likely to be in the same legal position as a sixteenyear-old defendant, even though one can legally consent and the other
cannot.
An understanding of the legal significance of these six categories
helps narrow the scope of a discussion of whether voluntary sexual activity between teenagers should be criminalized. First, conduct involving
victims in Category One, Two, or Three should not fall within a discussion of whether adolescents can voluntarily agree to participate in sexual
activity. 325 In the vast majority of states, any sexual activity that falls

within one of these categories is deemed the most serious child sexual
abuse offense, regardless of the defendant's age.3 26 Prosecutors do not

examine whether the children were boyfriend or girlfriend, or whether
322 See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
323 See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. See also app. C. The labels "defendant" and "victim" are particularly troublesome in this context since in these states the participants may be both defendant and victim.
324 See app. D.
325 See Regulating ConsensualSex, supra note 15, at 719-20 (discussing a case involving
eleven- and twelve-year-old victims); id. at 721-23 (discussing a case involving a thirteenyear-old victim); id. at 724-25 (discussing a case involving a thirteen-year-old victim).
326 See Phipps, supra note 14, at 58. In many states, fourteen-year-olds are included in
this category. Id.
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there was subtle coercion. Any sexual activity is a per se offense. Likewise, all conduct falling within Category Four can be excluded from the
discussion since, in most states, once the older party reaches adulthood,
that person is criminally liable for any sexual activity with an underage
327

child.

Thus, the issue of greatest concern is conduct involving Categories
Five and Six-sexual activity between two post-pubertal teenagers who
are not yet adults. Given that the age of consent is sixteen in the majority
of states, the issue can be stated in even more precise terms: How should
criminal statutes be written to respond to sexual activity between minors
who are fourteen and fifteen years old when the other participant is a
minor of comparable age?
B.

CLARIFY THE LANGUAGE

Just as important as the need to clearly identify the issue is the need
to use clear language when discussing the issue. While several conceptual difficulties are inherent but unavoidable in a discussion of minors
"consenting" to sexual activity, 3 28 the term "statutory rape" is one that
continues to be unnecessarily problematic.
The legal literature discussing sexual offenses against adolescents is
replete with various uses of the term "statutory rape." When the offense
was first created, the term referred to the statutory offense of rape that
contrasted with the common law offense of rape. 329 That is, "statutory
rape" described any sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of
consent, whether the victim was five or fourteen. As the age of consent
increased over the years, though, the term came to be used to describe
only sexual activity between an adult male or older adolescent and an
underage teenage female. Thus, as commonly used today, the term "statutory rape" is not used to describe the molestation of a five-year-old even
though this conduct fits within a technical definition of the term (that is,
the act is rape by operation of a statute declaring rape to be any sexual
intercourse with a person under the age of consent). Rather, commentators typically use the term to refer to sexual activity between an older
330
adolescent female and a man or an older adolescent male.
327 Of course, perceptions of unfairness arise when the age of consent is high and penal-

ties are severe. To this extent, laws in some states may need to be amended to maintain a
sense of proportionality between the conduct and punishment. See Oliveri, supra note 11, at
506-07.

328 See supra note 19 (discussing problems with the term "consent").
See FEINBERG, supra note 19, at 8-12 (discussing the history of the offense).
See, e.g., Guerrina, supra note 12 (focusing on teenage girls); Hollenberg, supra note
11 (focusing on "teenage motherhood"); Kitrosser, supra note 12, at 326 (focusing on teenage
girls); Oliveri, supra note 11, at 499 (focusing on teenage girls). Oberman's focus likewise is
on sexual activity between teenage girls and older boys or men.
329
330
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Because the term "statutory rape" has one technical meaning and
another colloquial meaning, the term should be used with care. 33 1 In
most instances, the term "child sexual abuse" more appropriately describes conduct involving adults who engage in sexual activity with minors under the age of consent or conduct involving an adolescent and a
pre-pubertal child. Likewise, "rape" is the most accurate description of
332
nonconsensual or forcible sexual activity.
In addition to clarifying the discussion, attention to accurate language accomplishes two societal goals. First, the terms "child sexual
abuse" and "rape" clearly stigmatize behavior as wrongful, labeling the
perpetrator either as one who molests children or one who forces another
to engage in acts of sexual penetration. Consider, for example, the numerous examples of indefensible male conduct provided by Oberman.
The members of the Spur Posse committed rape, not statutory rape; the
older adolescents in the Chicago case sexually abused eleven- and
twelve-year-old children; and Joshua Hemme raped two girls. Likewise,
the forty-nine-year-old man in Rife is a child sexual abuser, not a man
who was trapped by a seductive teenager into the crime of statutory rape.
Accurate labeling places a strong stamp of societal disapproval on crimi333
nal conduct.
A second benefit of using appropriate terminology is that it provides
an intuitive gauge by which to measure the wrongfulness of the sexual
behavior. If society's reaction to a particular act is "that's wrong, but it's
not child sexual abuse," then this reaction should cause policymakers to
pause and reconsider whether the prohibited conduct is appropriately circumscribed. 3 34 Applied to the act of voluntary sexual activity between
two teenagers, this test is telling. Labeling voluntary activity between
two teenagers as "rape" or "child sexual abuse" would strike most people
as incongruent. 33 5 Using accurate terminology in this way, therefore, allows policymakers to gauge the degree to which the prohibited conduct
is consistent with societal norms.
331 For additional discussion of the problems with this term, see Phipps, supra note 14, at
41-43. See also SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 101-02 (complaining about inaccurate use of
the term); English & Teare, supra note 193, at 830 (noting that statutory rape is "a somewhat
imprecise term").
332 Very few states retain use of the term "statutory rape" as the label for a crime defined
by statute. See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 566.034 (West Supp. 2002). In these states, therefore, the term has a precise legal definition and thus conveys a particular meaning in that state.
333 See PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 143 (1997).
334

See

PAUL

H.

ROBINSON & JOHN

M.

DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME: COMMU-

NITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 5-7 (1995).

335 In fact, the label that accurately describes fully voluntary sexual activity between mi-

nors is "fornication." See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-15-60-16-15-80 (1985) (defining the offenses of adultery and fornication).
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As the above discussion demonstrates, baseline definitional matters
are important. It is difficult to discuss legal issues in a consistent manner
when the underlying matters are not precisely stated. Moreover, the
criminal law has no hope of affecting societal conduct when the scope of
the criminal law is unclear. It is vital, therefore, that legal commentators
use clear language when discussing sexual crimes against teenagers.
C.

DETERMINE AN APPROPRIATE ROLE FOR STRICT LIABILITY
OFFENSES

Once the topic under discussion is clarified, the next step for legal
commentators and policymakers is to determine the proper role for strict
liability offenses. Oberman proposes that strict liability sex offenses be
broadly used by prosecutors to apply to conduct they perceive as coercive. While I have argued strongly against such a use of a strict liability
offense, 336 the use of strict liability offenses to regulate the conduct of
adolescents is not wholly indefensible (at least at a theoretical level).
The use of a strict liability offense to regulate consensual sexual
activity between teenagers is at least theoretically defensible if these offenses are strictly and uniformly enforced. Strict enforcement means establishing a bright line rule that a minor under the age of consent can
never consent to sexual activity and then uniformly enforcing that rule.
In effect, this view is a variation of Oberman's call to return to the use of
strict liability offenses, but with one important difference. Rather than
being used selectively as Oberman proposes, the laws would be applied
in a non-discretionary manner-any person who engages in sexual activity with a person under the age of consent is always prosecuted. Strict
enforcement of strict liability offenses under these conditions is appealing for several reasons.
First, strict enforcement sends a single, clear message that teenagers
can understand. Rather than sending a conflicting message to teenagers
(i.e., "You cannot lawfully engage in sexual intercourse, except under the
following circumstances . . ."), strict enforcement establishes an unmistakable rule about what constitutes criminal conduct. A law that is easily
understood and consistently enforced is more likely to have a deterrent
effect than a law that has many qualifications. Thus, assuming that one
of the societal goals is to lower the rate of teenage sexual activity, a strict
enforcement approach arguably could impact teenage sexual activity.
The alternative-setting an age of consent and then exempting voluntary
teenage sexual activity-is not likely to reduce the prevalence of teenage
sexual activity.
336 See supra notes 224-43 and accompanying text.
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Second, strict enforcement of strict liability offenses eliminates the
reliance upon broad prosecutorial discretion. Under such a scheme, all
cases would be categorically prosecuted with the understanding that no
minor under the age of consent-rich or poor, black or white-should be
making decisions about sexual activity. Similarly, prosecutors would not
have to make difficult decisions about culpability or whether age-span or
other elements of an offense have been met, mandatory reporters would
not have to make judgments about whether a crime took place, and an
under-age adolescent would have an easy answer to another adolescent
who wants to engage in sexual activity. Bright line rules allow for easy
decisionmaking.
Third, a strict enforcement approach would not require a complicated redrafting of statutory provisions. In effect, the law in twelve
states would be retained, and, in the remaining states, existing age span
provisions would be eliminated. No controversial debate over the definition of consent would be necessary. This is one proposal that legislators
could readily understand and draft with relative ease.
Fourth, strict enforcement is arguably feasible. While the number
of potential crimes that would result with this approach is extremely
large, it is not out of proportion with other conduct deemed criminal in
the United States. Using the 1990 population figures and the assumption
that forty-three percent of girls are sexually active by age sixteen, there
are (or were in 1990) about 1.3 million sexually active girls aged fourteen or fifteen. 3 37 Considering that an estimated six million assaults and
3.6 million household burglaries take place each year in the United
States, 338 one could perhaps argue it is reasonable to require the criminal
justice system to police approximately one million instances of sex in339
volving fourteen- and fifteen-year olds.
Finally, strict enforcement could further several legitimate societal
aims. A defensible argument can be made that minors under the age of
sixteen cannot appreciate the consequences of a decision to engage in
337 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS,

UNITED STATES 17,

1990

CENSUS OF POPULATION:

tbl.13 (1992). Using different

assumptions could alter this figure to just under one million. Leitenberg and Saltzman, for
example, indicate that thirty-one percent of their sample were sexually active by age fifteen.

Leitenberg & Heidi Saltzman, A Statewide Survey of Age at First Intercourse for Adolescent
Females and Age of Their Male Partners: Relation to Other Risk Behaviors and Statutory
Rape Implications, 29 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 203, 208 (2000). Although this figure
counts only girls, it is not necessary to count boys since the targeted conduct is the single
instance of sex involving one boy and one girl. Thus, the number essentially is an estimate of
the number of "potential crimes" that would be created if a strict liability rule were enforced.
338 See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION

2000

at 3 (2001).
339 Given the degree of sexual activity of American teenagers, though, a policy of strict
enforcement would become unreasonable if the age of consent were raised to seventeen or

eighteen.
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sexual activity 340 and that they are less likely to use adequate protections
during sexual activity and thus more likely to become pregnant or to
contract sexually transmitted diseases. 34 1 Such evidence provides adequate justification to categorically prohibit all sexual activity by teenagers under sixteen.
In spite of these arguments in favor of strictly enforcing strict liability offenses, considerably stronger reasons counsel against adoption of
this approach. Most significantly, sociological research makes it clear
that Americans have moved away from viewing voluntary sexual activity
between teenagers as a crime. In light of the fact that thirty-eight states
have removed voluntary teenage sexual activity from the criminal law
and that prosecution of such activity is rare in the remaining twelve states
that retain such statutes, it is hard to foresee these states reversing their
policies to place voluntary sexual activity back within the reach of prosecutors. 342 Although many in the United States view sex between unmarried people as immoral, 343 a majority believe that sex between willing
participants is morally acceptable. 34 4 Societal forces appear to be moving irreversibly against the trend to criminalize voluntary sexual activity
345
between teenagers.
Even if the political will existed to re-criminalize the conduct, active enforcement of such laws would be highly unlikely. Given the limited resources in police and prosecutor offices-as well as societal norms
See, e.g., Turning Girls into Women, supra note 15, at 68-69.
See id. at 62.
342 A series of Florida decisions reflects the tension created by laws that deem older adolescents incapable of consenting to sexual activity. See State v. Rife, 2001 WL 359697 (Fla.
2001) (unpublished opinion), affirming State v. Rife, 733 So. 2d 541 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(en banc) (allowing the consideration of a victim's willingness or consent as a mitigating
factor at sentencing when the victim is seventeen and the defendant is twenty-nine); J.A.S. v.
State, 705 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1998) (upholding the constitutionality of a criminal statute applied
to two fifteen-year-old boys who engaged in sexual activity with twelve-year-old girls); B.B.
v. State, 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995) (holding a criminal statute unconstitutional as applied to a
sixteen-year-old who engaged in sexual activity with another sixteen-year-old); Jones v. State,
640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994) (upholding the constitutionality of a criminal statute applied to
eighteen- nineteen- and twenty-year old males who engaged in sexual activity with fourteenyear-olds); see also Roberto Suro, Town Faults Law, Not Boy in Sex Case, WASH. POST, May
11, 1997, at Al (discussing the community reaction to prosecution of an eighteen-year-old in
Wisconsin who impregnated his fifteen-year-old girlfriend).
343 See SEX, LOVE, AND HEALTH IN AMERICA, supra note 125, at 22 (noting that approximately thirty percent of U.S. society considers sex appropriate only in marriage).
344 Seventy percent of the U.S. population believes either that sex is always acceptable if
it does not hurt someone or that sex is acceptable so long as the participants are in love. It is
reasonable to assume from this that most people in the country do not believe such conduct
should be criminalized. See SEX, LOVE, AND HEALTH IN AMERICA, supra note 125, at 22
(stating that twenty-five percent of Americans have a "recreational" view of sex and forty-five
percent have a "relational" view of sex).
345 See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 332, at 5-7 (discussing problems with criminal
laws that are inconsistent with prevailing societal norms).
340
341
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of what constitutes acceptable sexual activity-few jurisdictions would
have the desire or the ability to aggressively pursue these cases. Shifting
resources to policing voluntary sexual activity among this age group
would run the risk of diminishing resources devoted to prosecuting acts
of rape and child sexual abuse. More difficult than the problem of enforcement is the problem of detection. It is difficult enough to discover
child sexual abuse and rape under existing law. Without massive police
action to monitor sexually active adolescents, it is highly unlikely that
voluntary sexual activity between teenagers would come to the attention
of authorities. An aggressive effort to root out cases would not only be
costly and time consuming, it would make it less likely that teenagers
would seek health care and contraception, further exacerbating societal
problems.
Finally, the implications of a strict enforcement approach may likely
be too uncomfortable for many people. A strict enforcement policy
would mean that any time one participant to sexual activity is below the
age of consent, the other person is always a criminal defendant. No exceptions could be made based on the degree of "true love" or the gender
of the other person. Likewise, if both participants are under the age of
consent, both would be prosecuted. Since no child under the age of consent could consent to sexual activity, then anyone (including another
child) engaging in sexual activity with this person would be committing
an offense.
For these reasons, the strategy of using strict liability offenses to
prosecute voluntary sexual activity between teenagers is not likely to be
relied upon as the primary reform mechanism for protecting teenagers in
most states. Instead, the modem trend-exempting voluntary sexual activity between teenagers from the reach of the criminal law-is much
more likely to continue. A consequence of the modem trend, though, is
the centrality of the definition of the crime of rape. In particular, the
question of what constitutes coercion is critical for protecting teenagers
from being raped by other teenagers.
D.

DEFINE THE WRONGFUL CONDUCT

Recognizing that the modem trend represents the current status and
the likely future of the law in the United States, the focus of law reform
returns to a definition of coercion that adequately protects teenagers.
Fortunately, this is not a novel issue that must be addressed with an entirely new approach, as considerable work has been under way for many
years on how to identify nonconsensual sexual activity between
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adults. 346 Much of this work is directly applicable to coercive sexual
activity between teenagers.
One thoughtful recommendation is Professor Stephen Schulhofer's
proposal that consent must be affirmatively given. 347 Schulhofer reasons
that respect for a person's sexual autonomy requires nothing less than
"positive willingness, clearly communicated." Thus, the state would
have to prove that the defendant did not have permission, and the victim's silence would not be evidence of permission. 348 Such an approach
has much to commend it in the context of sex between teenagers. It
accounts for the dynamics of victimization that Oberman notes; it establishes a clear rule that teenagers can understand; and it creates a relatively objective requirement that prosecutors can examine in assessing a
case. Moreover, Schulhofer recommends this be a separate offense that
would supplement forcible rape statutes. 34 9 While some commentators
are critical of Schulhofer's proposal, 350 a thorough examination of his
recommendation as applied to teenagers would be a welcome debate.
Heidi Kitrosser also presents a meaningful reform proposal for addressing the problem of consent in sexual encounters between teenagers.
Kitrosser argues for defining consent as "some manifestation of coopera35 1
tion in the act or an attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will."
Similar to Schulhofer, she would require proof of the "act or attitude" to
"manifest itself in words or actions indicating freely given agreement to
engage in sex."' 352 More controversially, Kitrosser argues for the creation of a rebuttable presumption of nonconsent within specified age
spans. 353 While this proposal is not without its difficulties, Kitrosser accurately identifies the central issue-the definition of consent-and
presents solutions that directly respond to this issue.
The proposals of Schulhofer and Kitrosser represent only two of
354
several reform proposals that have been advanced in the literature.
346 See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 254-73 (discussing consent in dating). For an
overview of the major reform proposals, see Bryden, supra note 242.
347 SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 271.
348 Id. A different standard would make intercourse illegal "when the other party's nonconsent is 'either obvious from the circumstances or else manifested by physical or verbal
resistance prior to intercourse."' Bryden, supra note 242, at 396. This is a variation of the "no
means no" approach. See ESTRICH, supra note 8, at 102-03.
349 Id. at 293 (Schulhofer's Model Criminal Statute for Sexual Offenses retains a more
serious forcible rape statute while creating the separate offense of Sexual Abuse.); see also
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously, 11 LAW & PHIL. 35, 67 (1992).
350 See Bryden, supra note 242, at 402-11.
351 Kitrosser, supra note 12, at 329 (punctuation omitted).
352 Id.
353 See id. at 327-33.
354 See also Oliveri, supra note 11 (proposing the elimination of many of the sex crimes

statutes that apply to voluntary sexual activity between teenagers); Guerrina, supra note 12
(focusing on sentencing issues).
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When combined with the vibrant debate in the context of broader rape
reform, a solid framework exists upon which to build further discussions
concerning the construction of statutes responding to nonconsensual sexual activity between teenagers.
CONCLUSION
The criminal law delineates basic, fundamental wrongs: Do not kill;
do not steal; do not threaten another with harm. 355 In the context of

sexual activity, the criminal law communicates two central messages: Do
not have sex with a person without that person's consent, and do not
have sex with a minor.356 If properly drawn, the criminal law is capable
of communicating these messages. If not properly drawn, the criminal
law will lose its moral authority and have little impact on behavior. 357
Oberman's proposal blurs these central messages. By relying on
selective enforcement of overbroad strict liability laws, her proposal
would make teenagers less certain as to acceptable conduct and less
likely to alter their behavior to comply with the law. Oberman's approach also threatens to make it more difficult to prosecute cases of child
sexual abuse and rape while diverting resources to cases that are not best
dealt with by criminal sanctions. In contrast, objective criteria such as
age differentials and position of authority provisions provide bright line,
enforceable rules of conduct. Likewise, a precise definition of consent
allows a clear message to be communicated to teenagers about unacceptable sexual behavior.
The problems associated with teenage sexual activity are complex. 358 Yet complexity should not result in confusion. Teenagers de-

serve to be protected from exploitive behavior with laws that are
understandable, enforceable, and fair.

355 See generally ROBINSON, supra note 332.
356 A related message is that older children do not ever engage in sexual activity with
younger children.
357 See Bryden, supra note 242, for a cogent argument that statutory reform in the area of
acquaintance rape involving adults has not increased protection for these victims.
358 No single reform will be adequate to protect teenagers from harmful sexual encounters. Numerous additional reforms related to evidentiary issues, reporting, and other areas

will continue to be important in developing a comprehensive system that protects children.
For a summary of other reform efforts, see LEVESQUE, supra note 1, at 235-38.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A

Age of Consent in Each State

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky

Age
16
16
18
16
18
17
16
16
18
16
16
18
17
16
16
15
16

State
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota

Age
17
16
15
16
16
16
17
17
16
16
16
16
16
16
17
16
15

t

State
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Age
16
15
15
16
16
16
16
18
17
16
16
18
16
16
16
18

I See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62 (Lexis Supp. 2001); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.436 (Lexis
2000); A~iz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405 (West 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-127 (Lexis
Supp. 2001); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 2002); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402
(2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-71 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. it. 11, § 771 (Michie
2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.05 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3 (Lexis 1999); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-730 (Lexis Supp. 2002); IDAHO CODE § 18-6101 (Michie Supp. 2002);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-16 (West Supp. 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-9 (West
1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West Supp. 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3504 (1995); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.060 (Lexis Supp. 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:80 (West Supp.
2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 254 (West Supp. 2001); MD. CRIM. L. CODE ANN.
§ 3-307 (Michie 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 23 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.520d (West Supp. 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344 (West Supp. 2002); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-65 (Lexis 2000); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 566.034 (West Supp. 2002); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-501, 45-5-503 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319 (1995); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 200.364, 200.368 (Lexis 2001 & Supp. 2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:3(II)
(Lexis Supp. 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West Supp. 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-911 (Michie Supp. 2002); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25 (West Supp. 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-27.7A (Lexis 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-05 (Lexis Supp. 2001); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.04 (Supp. 2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1 11 (West Supp. 2002); OR. REV.
STAT. § 163.435 (2001); PA. CONS. STAT. tit. 18, § 3122.1 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1137-6 (Lexis 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-1 (Lexis
Supp. 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-506 (Michie 1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011
(West Supp. 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402 (Lexis 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252
(Lexis 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371 (Michie 1996); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.079
(West 2000); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-5 (Lexis 2000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 948.09 (West 1996);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-304 (Lexis 2001).
In Hawaii, a 2001 amendment raised the age of consent to sixteen. See HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 707-730 (Lexis Supp. 2002). However, this language is to be repealed effective June

30, 2003, and return to the prior age of consent to fourteen unless the legislature affirmatively
acts to retain sixteen as the age of consent. See Editor's Note to HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-

730 (Lexis Supp. 2002).
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Appendix B
States in Which Certain Voluntary Sexual Activity Between
Teenagers Is Exempted from
1
Criminal Statutes
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Hawaii
Indiana
Iowa

Name of Offense or
Defense

Minimum Age of
Defendant 2

Age of
Victim 3

Age
Differential

2' rape
2' sexual abuse of a
minor
Defense to sexual conduct
with minor
40 sexual assault
Sexual assault
Sexual assault
I' sexual assault
2' sexual assault
Affirmative defense to
rape
1° sexual assault
Sexual misconduct with a
minor
3' sexual abuse

16
16

12-15
13-15

2 years
3 years

19 or high school

15-17

none

20
none
none
none
none
none

under
under
15-16
under
13-15
under

none
18

14-15
14-15

5 years
none

none

14-15

4 years

16
15
13
16

none
4 years
10 years
2 years
2 years
4 years

See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62 (Lexis Supp. 2001); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.436 (2000);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(F) (West 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-127 (Lexis Supp.

2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(d) (2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(e) (2001);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70(a)(2) (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-71(a)(1)
(West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I1, § 762(d) (Michie 2001); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707730 (Lexis Supp. 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-9 (West 1998); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 709.4(2)(c)(4) (West Supp. 2002); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.050 (Lexis 1999); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 510.060 (Lexis Supp. 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:80(A)(1) (West Supp.
2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 254 (West Supp. 2001); MD. CRIM. L. CODE ANN.
§ 3-307 (Michie 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(1)(b) (West Supp. 2002); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-65(1)(a) (Lexis 2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95(l)(c) (Lexis 2000); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-95(1)(d) (Lexis 2000); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 566.034 (West Supp.
2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319(l)(c) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.364 (Lexis 2001); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C: 14-2(c)(4) (West Supp. 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (F) (Michie Supp.
2002); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.25, 130.40 (West Supp. 2002); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.30,
130.45 (West Supp. 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7A (Lexis 1999); N.D. CEr. CODE
§ 12.1-20-05 (Lexis Supp. 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.04 (Supp. 2001); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, § 1112 (West 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.345 (2001) (age as defense); OR.
REV. STAT. § 163.435 (2001) (contributing); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.445 (2001) (sexual
misconduct); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.355 (2001) (rape); PA. CONS. STAT. tit. 18, § 3122.1 (West
2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-6 (Lexis 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-1(5) (Lexis
Supp. 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-506 (Michie 1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.011(e) (West Supp. 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-401.1 (Lexis 1999); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-401.2 (Lexis 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(3) (Lexis 1998); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-371 (Michie 1996); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.079 (West 2000); WASH. REV.

CODE § 9A.44.089 (West 2000); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-5 (Lexis 2000); W. VA. CODE § 618B-9 (Lexis 2000); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-304 (Lexis 2001).
2 The terms "defendant" and "victim" are used here

for convenience, with the

recognition that participants to the sexual activity will only become potential defendants and
victims if the older party falls outside the protected age parameter.
3 All hyphenated ages are inclusive of both the lower and upper age provided in this
column.
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Appendix B (cont.)
State
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Nebraska
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon

Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
6

Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wyoming

Name of Offense or
Defense
2' rape
30 rape
Carnal knowledge of a
juvenile
Sexual abuse of minors
30 sexual offense
40 sexual offense
30 criminal sexual
conduct
Statutory rape
Sexual battery
Sexual battery
2' statutory rape
10 sexual assault
Statutory sexual seduction
Sexual assault
Criminal sexual
penetration
30 rape and 30 sodomy
2' rape and 20 sodomy
Statutory rape
Corruption of minors
Sexual conduct with a
minor
Defense to rape
Defense to contributing to
delinquency
Defense to sexual
misconduct
Defense to 30 rape
Statutory sexual assault
30 sexual assault
Rape
Statutory rape
Sexual assault
Sexual abuse of a minor
Unlawful sexual conduct
Sexual assault
Causing delinquency
30 rape of a child
30 child molestation
30 sexual assault
30 sexual abuse
30 sexual assault

Minimum Age of
Defendant 4
18
21
19

Age of
5
Victim
under 14
under 16
12-16

Age
Differential
none
none
none

none
21
none
none

14-15
14-15
14-15
13-15

5 years
none
4 years
2 years

17
none
none
21
19
18
none
18

14-15
14-15
under 14
under 17
under 16
under 16
13-15
13-16

3 years
3 years
2 years
none
none
none
4 years
4 years

21
18
none
adult
18

under 17
under 15
13-15
15-17
13-15

none
4 years
4-6 years
none
none

18
18

under 16
under 18

none
3 years

none

15-17

3 years

none
none
18
none
none
none
none
none
16
18
none
none
16
16
none

under 16
under 16
14-15
10-15
13-17
14-16
14-15
16-17
under 16
15-17
14-15
14-15
under 16
under 16
under 16

3 years
4 years
none
3 years
4 years
3 years
7 years
10 years
none
none
2 years
2 years
4 years
4 years
4 years

4 The terms "defendant" and "victim" are used here for convenience, with the
recognition that participants to the sexual activity will only become potential defendants and
victims if the older party falls outside the protected age parameter.
5 All hyphenated ages are inclusive of both the lower and upper age provided in this
column.
6 Interpreted by the state supreme court to be inapplicable to consensual sexual activity
between juveniles under the age of sixteen. See In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301 (Vt. 2000).
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State

Appendix C
States in Which Voluntary Sexual Activity Between Teenagers Is a Crime]
3
2
Age of Victim
Felony or Misdemeanor
Offense

California

Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Kansas
Massachusetts
Michigan
Montana
New Hampshire
South Carolina
Wisconsin

[Vol. 12:373

Unlawful sexual
intercourse
Forcible sexual
penetration
Lewd or lascivious
offense
Statutory rape
Lewd conduct with minor
Rape
Criminal sexual abuse
Unlawful voluntary sexual
relations
Rape and abuse of child
3' criminal sexual
conduct
Sexual intercourse
without consent
Felonious sexual assault
Criminal sexual conduct
with minors
Sexual assault of a child
Sexual intercourse with a
child 16 or older

Misdemeanor if within 3
years
Misdemeanor 4

under 18

Felony

12-15

Misdemeanor
Felony
Felony
Misdemeanor
Felony

14-15
under 16
under 18
13-16
14-15

Felony
Felony

under 16
13-15

Felony

under 16

Felony
Felony

13-15
under 16

Felony
Misdemeanor

under 16
16-17

under 18

I See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 2001); CAL. PENAL CODE § 289(h) (West
1999 & Supp. 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.04(4)(a) (West Supp. 2002); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-6-3 (Lexis 1999); IDAHO CODE § 18-1508 (Michie 1997); IDAHO CODE § 18-6101
(Michie Supp. 2002); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-15(b) (West Supp. 2002); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3522 (Supp. 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 23 (West 2000); MICH.
COMp. LAWS § 750.520d (West Supp. 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503 (2001); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:3(II) (Lexis Supp. 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(3) (1985);
WiS. STAT. ANN. § 948.02 (West 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 948.09 (West 1996).
2 The term "felony" as used here indicates either that the offense is described as a felony
in the statute or the statute does not use the term felony, but allows imposition of a sentence of
one year or more. The term "misdemeanor" indicates either that the offense is described as a
misdemeanor in the statute or the statute does not use the term, but limits the sentence to no
more than one year.
3 All hyphenated ages are inclusive of both the lower and upper age provided in this
column.
4 If the defendant is over twenty-one, the offense is a felony. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 261.5(d), 289(i) (West 1999 & Supp. 2001).
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Appendix D
Rape Statutes

I Citation

Citation
C itation....

ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61 (Lexis Supp. 2000)
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410 (2000)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406 (West

Mor.

(cont.)
1....
§ 45-5-503 (2001)
§ 28-319 (1995)
§ 200.366 (Lexis 2001)

CODE ANN.

NEB. REV. STAT.
NEV. REV. STAT.

2001)
ARK. CODE

§ 5-14-127 (Lexis Supp.

ANN.

2001)
CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 289 (West 1999 &

Supp. 2001)
COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-402 (2001)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 53a-70

(West

2001)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

11, § 773 (Michie

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2 (Lexis
Supp. 2002)
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West Supp.
2002)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (Michie Supp.
2002)
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35 (West Supp.

2002)
N.C. GEN.

STAT. § 14-27.2 (Lexis 1999)

Supp. 2000)
FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 794.011 (West 2000)

GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1 (Lexis 1999)
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-730 (Lexis

N.D. CEWr.
1997)

§ 12.1-20-03 (Michie

CODE

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05 (1999)
OKLA. STAT.

tit. 21, § 1114 (West Supp.

2001)

Supp. 2001)
IDAHO CODE § 18-6101 (Michie Supp. 2002)
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-13 (West

OR. REV. STAT. § 163.411
PA. CONS. STAT. tit. 18, §

(2001)
3121 (West 2000)

Supp. 2002)
§ 11-37-2 (Lexis 2000)

IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1 (West 1998)
IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.3 (West Supp. 2002)
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502 (Supp. 2001)

R.I.

Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.040 (Lexis

TENN. CODE ANN.

GEN. LAWS

S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-652 (1985)
S.D. CODIED LAWS § 22-22-1 (Lexis Supp.

2002)
§ 39-13-503 (Michie

1997)

1999)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 14:41

(West Supp.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.011 (West

Supp. 2002)

2002)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.

17-A, § 253 (West

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 3-304

VT. STAT. ANN. tit.

§ 76-5-402 (Lexis 1999)

Supp. 2001)
MD. CRIM. L. CODE ANN.

(Michie

13, § 3252 (Lexis 1998)

2002)
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.

265, § 22 (West

VA. CODE ANN. §

18.2-61 (Michie Supp.

2001)

2000)
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b (West 1991)
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342 (West Supp.

WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.040 (West
W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-4 (Lexis 2000)

2000)

2002)
Miss. CODE ANN.

§ 97-3-95 (Lexis 2000)

WIs. STAT. ANN.

§ 940.225 (West Supp.

2000)
Mo.

REV. STAT. ANN.

Supp. 2002)

§ 566.040 (West

WYo. STAT. ANN.

§ 6-2-302 (Lexis 2001)

